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INTRODUCTION
Congress's use of conditions in the context of spending legislation has
produced an extetisive legal literature analyzing the constitutional ramifica-
tions of exercising power in this manner.1 Conditioning the grant of federal
funds on activities arguably outside of Congress's direct regulatory author-
ity raises a number of issues and, in certain kinds of cases, can risk
undermining the civil liberties of the recipients or other basic constitutional
principles such as federalism.2 Courts usually have interpreted Congress's
conditioning power expansively.3 Only recently have some commentators
become more interested in the appropriate limits of those powers. 4
Although there is clearly an administrative law analogue to Congress's
use of conditions, there has been little analysis of the use and outer limits
of conditions that administrative agencies impose when granting regulatory
benefits to applicants or issuing administrative orders for litigants. Condi-
tions are an important regulatory tool that many agencies regularly use,
particularly those, like the Federal Reserve Board, that are engaged in the
administration of essentially one-on-one regulatory programs that put a
premium on an agency's ability to tailor informally its regulatory demands
to the facts particular to the party before it.-
This Article explores the use of conditions at the agency level. Its
primary purpose is to provide an appropriate administrative law frame-
work for analyzing the use and limits of an agency's conditioning power.
There are three additional purposes or by-products of this analysis. First,
this Article focuses on the use of conditions and voluntary commitments6 by
the Federal Reserve Board (Fed). The Fed is one of the most powerful and
1. See, e.g., Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1415 (1989); Rosenthal,
Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STiN. L. REv. 1103 (1987); see also, Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights In a Positive State, 132 U. Pi,. L. REv. 1293,
1294-97 nn. 1-11 (1984) (citing authorities on increased government spending).
2. See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1120.
3. See infra text and accompanying notes 214-25 (discussing South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987)).
4. See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1131-61.
5. For a detailed eyamination of the application process under the Bank Holding
Company Act, see infra text and accompanying notes 149-88.
6. As used by the Federal Reserve Board, a condition is a specific requirement in an
agency order that, presumably, is supported by the record and is subject to judicial review. See
infra p. 881. A voluntary commitment is a condition that a part), presumably agrees to honor
voluntarily. It may or may not be supported by the record or appear on the face of the agency's
order (it often is in a letter of transmittal), and it usually is not subject to judicial review. See
infra pp. 881-82.
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independent federal agencies engaged in economic regulation. 7 The Fed
derives much of its power from its ability to set the monetary policy of the
United States; however, it has extensive regulatory authority as well. It is
one of the primary regulators of banks and banking policy in the United
States. Although the Fed has long been analyzed, criticized, and praised for
its substantive monetary or regulatory policies, few studies have focused on
the Fed as an administrative agency. An important by-product of this
discussion of administrative conditions and voluntary commitments is, thus,
the application of administrative law principles to the exercise of some of
the Fed's regulatory powers.
Second, an analysis of the Fed's use of conditions leads to a more
general exploration of a significant informal agency decisionmaking pro-
cess, one more akin to regulatory negotiation and settlement than to the
commonly studied agency processes of adjudication or rulemaking. Condi-
tions and commitments are the currency of the informal bargaining process
by which the Fed reviews applications for expansion and acquisitions under
the Bank Holding Company Act.8 Thus, the Fed's use of conditions and
commitments presents an important opportunity to study an aspect of the
administrative process heretofore relatively unexplored in legal literature.9
Finally, this Article comments on the relationship between the Fed's
use of its conditioning powers and change, particularly the technological
changes and the increasing globalization of financial markets that have
dramatically affected banking and the banking industry.' 0 Conditions can
provide an agency an opportunity to extend its regulatory powers either in
a manner that seeks to accommodate new market and technological forces,
or in a manner that seeks to resist these changes. The overall regulatory
framework sets the formal limits on how far an agency can go in either
direction, but the struggle between market and political forces occurs most
dramatically in a time of rapid change. Controversies surrounding some of
the informal uses of the Fed's regulatory powers highlight both this
struggle and the limits of the regulatory and statutory frameworks within
which it occurs.
To set the stage for analysis of the Fed's use of conditions, this Article
takes a contextual approach. Part I begins with a brief description of the
Federal Reserve Board, its history, and its structure.1 Part II then
examines the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,12 the Act on which our
analysis of the Federal Reserve Board's use of conditions focuses. In so
7. See generally T. DE SANT PHAU.E, THE FEDERAL REsER E 76-78 (1985); D. Krrn, LEADERSHiP
AT THE FED 1-17 (1986).
8. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
9. Agencies exercise most of their power informally. This ad hoc, flexible manner seems
to defy analysis, and one must be careful not to impose an artificial structure on these
processes. The malleability of informal decisionmaking makes it difficult to study, but
extremely important to the everyday functioning of an agency. This Article's study of
conditions contributes to the growing and important literature dealing with informal agency
processes.
10. See Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered, 13 J. CoRr. L. 483-84
(1988).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 15-59.
12. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982)).
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doing this Article demonstrates how changes in technology, the globaliza-
tion of financial markets, and the emergence of a new financial services
industry have created a variety of regulatory pressures on the Fed. These
pressures can encourage the Fed to authorize certain kinds of banking
activities with the hope of enabling a bank holding company to compete
effectively when the bank is subject to more intense and different forms of
competition. Many of these pressures are apparent in the Fed's imposition
of conditions and raise some perennial administrative law issues: How
should agencies resolve important policy questions, and what role should
an administrative staff play in their resolution?
Part II sets forth the substantive and procedural background necessary
to the detailed exploration of these questions in Part III. Part II first studies
the evolution of the Bank Holding Company Act and then examines the
procedures by which the Fed entertains applications under sections 3 and
4 of that Act. Part II specifically analyzes the formal and informal
adjudicatory procedures used to resolve some of the disputes that arise
under the Act.' 3 Although these procedures are not used often, they
nevertheless provide the adversarial framework within which disputes
under this Act theoretically may be resolved.
With the structural, substantive, and procedural background set forth
in Parts I and II, Part III analyzes the Fed's conditioning powers. It begins
by differentiating among three interrelated but analytically distinct phases
of the administrative process: the informational phase, the bargaining or
negotiation phase, and the more commonly studied adversarial phase. Part
III then focuses on the bargaining phase of the process and sets out five
types of regulatory conditions.' 4 In so doing, this Article examines more
fully the concept of "voluntariness" in the context of bargaining with the
Federal Reserve Board. It concludes that there are certain contexts in which
agency conditions should be used sparingly, if at all.
More importantly, this Article suggests thai: there are limits to an
agency's ability to foster or inhibit change without direct congressional
involvement. The global era in which we live requires comprehensive
regulatory changes that, at some point, only Congress can institute.
I. THE REGULATORY CONTEXT OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
Part I sets forth the structure and powers of the Federal Reserve
Board. This part of the Article sketches the basic regulatory context in
which the Fed exercises its powers over bank holding companies. This
contextual approach not only enables us to track the evolution of the Fed
into a powerful administrative agency, but it also highlights the new, global
realities the Fed now faces. These include an essentially new financial
services industry that seems increasingly at odds with a regulatory structure
created at a different time to meet similar, but also very different, problems.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 149-210.
14. Part III divides conditions into five general types: the perfect condition, the policy
condition, the legal authority condition, the prospective condition, and the null condition. See
infra text accompanying notes 237-48.
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A. The Federal Reserve System -Substantive Powers
Congress established the Federal Reserve System with the Federal
Reserve Act on December 23, 1913.15 This Act created a central banking
structure consisting of three components: a Board of Governors, twelve
regional Federal Reserve Banks, and various member banks. This federal
reserve system initially was designed to remedy perceived defects in United
States monetary policy and banking organization. Before its passage, there
had been recurrent money panics and bank failures. Particularly notable
was the panic of 1907 that, in many ways, was perhaps most responsible for
the creation of the Federal Reserve System.16
From the outset, the drafters of the Act viewed the new reserve system
as a means to promote economic stability through regulation of credit
conditions. 17 As expressed in the Act's preamble, the original purposes of
15. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 221-522 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
16. On October 22, 1907, the country's third-largest bank, Knickerbocker Trust Company,
failed because of a run by its depositors. A run on most New York City banks followed, and
within a few days the Trust Company of America, the country's second-largest bank, was
forced to close temporarily. At that point, J.P. Morgan organized a group of Wall Street
bankers to guarantee enough cash to all New York banks to prevent additional bank failures.
The panic made it obvious that the banking system provided inadequate protection for
depositors. With no central organization, banks acted independently to protect their own
reserves. Thus, a run on one bank resulted in every bank rushing to protect its own position.
In addition, many smaller banks had deposited their reserve requirements in the large New
York banks. The New York banks, in turn, used the money to purchase stocks. When the panic
began, these large banks were not able to return the deposits to the smaller banks because the
money was tied up in stock market investments that could not be liquidated. This had a
pyramid effect, drastically reducing the liquidity of all banks at a time when depositors were
demanding their money. The banking community concluded that a central bank, acting as
lender of last resort (the role played by Morgan in the autumn of 1907), was needed. Congress,
spurred on by these New York bankers, responded by enacting the Federal Reserve Act of
1913. See M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HSTORY OF THE UNTED STATES, 1867-1960, at
156-68 (1963).
17. Henry Parker Willis, one of the chief draftsmen of the Federal Reserve Act and the
first secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, stated the goals of the Federal Reserve Act in a
memorandum to the Senate subcommittee responsible for the bill:
The object of the . . . proposed measures is that of arranging a cooperative
organization of the banks of the United States which should serve to afford these
banks the means of rediscounting their paper at times when they require assistance
or accommodation in order to continue extending loans to their customers, and in
order to avoid the curtailment of credit which in the past has frequently resulted in
precipitating commercial panics and stringency. The fundamental idea running
through these proposals is that of centralizing the control of discounts and reserves
as well as that of applying a more rigorous method of oversight to the operations of
the several banks which are expected to participate in the new scheme. It is supposed
by the authors of these plans that the institution which they aim to create would
accomplish at least the following financial results:
(1) Establishment of a uniform rate of discount throughout the United States, and
thereby the furnishing of a certain kind of control over bank operations which should
be similar in all parts of the country.
(2) General economy and centralization of reserves in order that such reserves
might be held ready for use in protecting the banks of any section of the country and
74 IOWA LAW REVIEW 837
the Federal Reserve System were to give the country an elastic currency, to
provide facilities for discounting commercial paper, and to improve the
supervision of banking. 18 The Act outlined the framework for achieving
these objectives. To provide a sound and elastic currency supply, the
reserves of member commercial banks in the twelve newly created Federal
Reserve Bank Districts were centralized.' 9 Member banks had access to
reserves through discount and borrowing facilities. : Additionally, if a bank
held sufficient assets to be eligible for discount with a Reserve Bank, it was
able to convert such deposits into Federal Reserve currency under section
16 of the Act.21 Facilities for discounting commercial paper were created by
empowering the Reserve Banks to discount standardized commercial paper
and to deal in certain securities. 22
Finally, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve
Board, composed of seven members, including the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, comprised a supervisory
body with the authority to oversee the volume, availability, and cost of
credit.23 Congress also delegated to the Federal Reserve Board the power to
issue currency without limit.24 It is important to note that the Fed's
responsibility for establishing monetary policy was not the primary purpose
envisioned by the drafters. The Act created the Fed "as a collection of super
correspondent banks organized chiefly to improve the country's payments
mechanism and to provide for seasonal currency needs, while supporting
the soundness of banking through its role as lender of last resort. '2 5
The two principal functions of the Federal Reserve today, if not
examined closely, seem remarkably similar to those undertaken by the
original Federal Reserve. Today, the Board of Governors of the Federal.
Reserve System, in conjunction with several other agencies, 26 regulates the
for enabling them to go on meeting their obligations instead of suspending payments,
as has so often been necessary in the past.
(3) Furnishing of an elastic currency by the abolition of the existing bond secured
note issue in whole or in part, and the substitution of a freely issued and adequately
protected system of bank notes which should be available to all institutions which had
the proper class of paper for presentation.
(4) Management and commercial use of the funds of the government which are
now isolated in the treasury and subtreasuries in large amounts.
(5) General supervision of the banking business and furnishing of stringent and
careful oversight.
H. WILLis, THE FEDERAL RESERVE Sysmi: LErISLsvnON, ORGANIZAnOr AND OPRA-non 117 (1923).
18. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. (251 current version at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 221-522 (1982 & Supp 1987)); see also supra note 17 (containing one drafter's views); infra
note 28 (quoting preamble of the Federal Reserve Act).
19. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 19, 38 Stat. 251, 270-71 (current version at 12
U.S.C. §§ 221 522 (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
20. Id. § 14, 38 Stat. at 264.
21. Id. § 16, 38 Stat. at 265.
22. Id. § 14, 38 Stat. at 264-65.
23. Id. § 11, 38 Stat. at 261.
24. Id. § 1I, 38 Stat. at 262.
25. W. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED: MAFING MONETARY Poucy 4 (1985).
26. The most notable of these agencies are the Comptroller of the Currency, under 12
U.S.C § 1 (1982), which creates the bureau known as Office of the Comptroller, and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932,
ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 422 (1982)), which supervises thrifts; and the
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commercial banking system of the United States. Under section 16 of the
Federal Reserve Act,27 the Fed also determines the United States money
supply and functions essentially as an independent central bank for the
United States Government. Despite the apparent coherence between the
original directives of the preamble to the 1913 Act 28 and today's perception
of the Federal Reserve's duties, the modern Federal Reserve has assumed a
more extensive role in economic regulation.
The commercial banking system the Fed now regulates differs radi-
cally from the pay-on-demand account system that was familiar to the
Reserve Act's creators and that was based on the gold standard. Little is
mentioned in the original Act about the establishment of a national
monetary and credit policy conducive to maintaining economic stability. 29
Rather, the Act focused on establishing service functions for member
banks. 30 In today's economy, however, the introduction of wide-scale
credit-based networks, NOW accounts, and other transactional forms of
credit present the Federal Reserve Board with a very different and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, urider the National Bank ("Glass-Steagall") Act of
1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 168 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 334-36 (1982)).
27. Ch. 6, § 16, 38 Stat. 251, 265 (1913) (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 411-21 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987)).
28. The preamble to the 1913 Act states: "To provide for the establishment of Federal
reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial
paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other
purposes." Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, 251.
29. The Act did provide for such powers as discounting, changing the discount rates, open
market operations, and examinations of member banks. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6,
§§ 11-21, 38 Stat. 251, 261-73 (1913). These were, however, secondary considerations
designed to promote sound credit conditions. See T. DR SAtNr PHALLE, supra note 7, at 55-56.
30. See T. DE SAit-r PHALLE, supra note 7, at 55. The drafters' plan to infuse banking with
stability included giving the Federal Reserve the ability to provide services such as the Federal
Reserve note and a mechanism to discount it. As Professors Friedman and Schwartz note:
The Federal Reserve System was created by men whose outlook on the goals of
central banking was shaped by their experience of money panics during the national
banking era. The basic monetary problem seemed to them to be banking crises
produced by or resulting in an attempted shift by the public from deposits to
currency. In order to prevent such shifts from producing either widespread bank
failures or the restriction of cash payments by banks, some means were required for
converting deposits into currency without a reduction in the total of the two. This in
turn required the existence of some form of currency that could be rapidly
expanded-to be provided by the Federal Reserve note-and some means of
enabling banks to convert their assets readily into such currency-to be the role of
discounting. Since commercial banks then held a large fraction of their assets in the
form of "notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial
transactions," limiting the "lender of last resort" to the rediscounting of only such
paper was not a serious limitation, though it is hard to see any advantage in it. Its
imposition doubtless reflected, on the one hand, a disapproval of "speculative" as
opposed to "commercial" activities, on the other, confusion between "elasticity" of
one component of the money stock relative to others and "elasticity" of the total-a
disapproval and a confusion that have plagued the Reserve System throughout its
history and are still with us in nearly undiminished strength.
M: FRIED.MAN & A. SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 192 (quoting Banking and Currency Reform:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of House Banking and Currency Comm., 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 107-16(1913) (statement of J. Laurence Laughlin); see id. at 189-96 (providing a general description
of the Fed's performance of these service functions in its early years).
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constantly evolving financial services industry.3l
More importantly, the role of the Federal Reserve as the central bank
for the United States is. more significant than ever. Control of the money
supply has made the Fed the monetary policy planner for the United States.
The fact that the entire global economy has been operating on a paper
dollar monetary system since 197132 means that tie Federal Reserve Board
has enormous influence over the economic growth and functioning not
only of the United States, but of the world as well. One commentator
observes that actions of the Board may determine whether the global
economy functions in an inflationary or deflationary cycle; whether eco-
nomic growth is encouraged or constrained; and whether, and to what
extent, spending or saving is stimulated or discouraged through greater or
lesser growth of the United States money supply.
33
31. See R. LITArN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 41-59 (1987).
32. See Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 93-110, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (repealing 31
U.S.C. §§ 442, 443), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-973, 88 Stat. 445 (1974); see also Executive
Order No. 11,825, 3A C.F.R. 929 (1975), reprinted in 12 U.S.C § 95 (1982).
33.. See T. DE SAINT PHAL E, supra note 7, at i0. Of course, Japan, West Germany, and other
developed countries now have a great effect on global economic events. Nevertheless, the Fed
has long recognized its significant role in influencing the global economy. In its handbook of
operations, the Board of Governors wrote:
In forming thejudgments about prospective economic developments that underlie
monetary policy decisions, Federal Reserve policy makers regularly take into account
the relationships that link the domestic economy to the rest of the world-for
example, the forces that affect foreign demand for U.S. goods and services, the
determinants of supply and demand in this country for U.S. products that compete
with imports, the factors influencing international flows of funds, and the effects of
international flows of funds on domestic financial markets. These relationships are
viewed from two related perspectives. First, developments in the rest of the world
may have significant implications for the domestic economic objectives of the United
States and for the use of monetary policy in attaining these objectives. Second,
economic developments in this country have important influences on the net balance
of goods and services transactions and the net flow of long-term and liquid capital
between the United States and foreign countries, which in turn affect the interna-
tional value of the dollar and the international reserve position of the United States.
BOARD or GovERNoRs, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTE.M: PuRPosE AND FuNcnoNs 92 (6th ed. 1974)
[hereinafter BOARD OF GoVEmNoRs]. Another commentator, in an analysis of Paul Volcker's
stewardship of the Fed, suggested that "the world's economies, furthermore, were becoming
increasingly interdependent. The Fed's policies powerfully influenced not only American
growth but also the ability of less-developed countries to repay their debt, the value of the
dollar, and the competitiveness of American industries abrcad." D. Kn-rr, supra note 7, at
190-91. Another analysis of banking regulation suggested that
recent and prospective changes in the U.S. financial system stem from deeply rooted
technological and economic developments that span the global financial system.
Further, it is apparent that the internationalization of the U.S. financial system that
has occurred in recent years has contributed significantly to recent regulatory (and
deregulatory) developments.
K. COOPER & D. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW CoMPETITION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY 71 (1984). Cooper and Fraser also concluded that
while the path of deregulation may vary among nations because of differing economic and
political circumstances (as well as differences in the present structure of their financial
systems), it is equally apparent that there is now a worldfinanial system and that national
financial systems can exercise total independence from it only by imposing upon the
larger economy a highly significant cost.
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Another important aspect of the Federal Reserve's enormous power is
the relationship between its control of United States monetary policy and
financing of government spending. For example, the Fed could tighten the
money supply through open market transactions or increased reserve
requirements. Either action independently could increase interest rates and
affect the financing of the public debt. In addition, the size of the federal
budget deficit affects interest rates and public debt financing.3 When the
Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913, the public debt was very small. No
one could have predicted either its monumental increase in size or the use
of the Fed's resources to finance this deficit.35
In short, there can be little dispute that the Fed's power and influence
is now enormous. Characterizing the changes that have occurred since the
Federal Reserve System was established in 1913, Thibaut de Saint Phalle
concludes, "It is no longer a mechanism mandated to make the banking
system function better through new tools but rather a most powerful
quasi-independent agency of government subject to no control or even
audit."36
B. The Structure of the Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors3 7 sits at the apex of the
Id. at 75; see also id. at 91-101 (examining participation by United States banks in global
financial markets); B. BECKHART, FEDERAL RESERvE SYsTEM 418-61 (1972) (analyzing the role of the
Fed in the international monetary system). See generally Symposium: Current Issues of International
Financial Law, 20 INT'L LAw. 453-97, 765-865 (1986) (containing specific treatments of the
problems presented by the global economy); Symposium: The Internationalization of the Securities
Markets, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1-199 (1986) (same).
34. See NEw YORK COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, THE FEDERAL RESERVE RE-EXAMINED
141 (1953) (market for government securities affects terms of public and private financing).
35. See id. at 141-42 (borrowing by Department of Treasury to finance public debt affects
Fed's credit policies).
36. T. DE SAINT PHALLE, supra note 7, at 56. Of course, given the powerful role the Fed now
plays in monetary policy, it does not necessarily follow that the Fed may be or should be less
independent. Perhaps administration of monetary policy needs to be above the political fray.
Nevertheless, the question arises as to what extent the independence exercised by the Fed in
carrying out its monetary responsibilities does or should carry over to the Fed's more
regulatory and, thus, more administrative-agency-like duties under acts such as the Bank
Holding Company Act. As we shall see, the Fed also exercises much of its regulatory power
with remarkable independence, thereby highlighting some of the procedural issues that arise
in the context of the Fed's imposition of certain kinds of conditions. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 229-49.
37. Although the Board supervises and regulates commercial banks and the Federal
Reserve Banks, its primary function is to formulate monetary policy. Board members make up
a majority of the Federal Open Market Committee. 12 U.S.C. § 263 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The
Board sets the reserve requirements of member banks, reviews the discount rate actions,
governs the discount windows of the Federal Reserve Banks, sets ceiling rates on interest that
member banks may pay on time-and-demand deposits, and sets the margin requirements on
stock market credit purchases. Id. § 248. The seven members of the Board are appointed by
the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Members are
appointed for fourteen-year terms, with one term to expire every two years. Members may
serve for only one full term. The chairman and vice chairman, selected by the President from
among the Board members, serve for four-year terms, and can be reappointed. See id. § 241;
see also BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 33, at 13-14 (discussing the appointment provisions of
the The Federal Reserve Act).
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Federal Reserve System. Beneath it are twelve regional Federal Reserve
Banks 38 and a number of member banks. Member banks39 are the financial
institutions that become members of the Federal Reserve System by
purchasing stock in their local Federal Reserve :Banks. 40 National Banks,
banks chartered by the federal government, must become members of the
Federal Reserve System; state-chartered commercial banks or trust compa-
nies, however, are not required to join.41
38. The administration of the regional banks is summarized as follows:
Each of the twelve Federal Reserve banks has nine directors, divided into three
classes: A, B, and C. The directors serve for three-year terms, with one-third of each
class retiring each year; but those retiring are eligible for reelection or reappoint-
ment. Class A and B directors are elected by the member banks which for the purpose
of election are divided by size of capital funds into three groups. Each group of banks
elects one class A and one class B director. Class A directors are representatives of
stock-holding banks, i.e., bankers; class B directors are actively engaged in commerce,
agriculture, or industry, but they may not be officers, directors, or employees of any
bank. Class A directors are expected to be familiar with the problems of lenders and
class B directors with those of borrowers.
Class C directors are appointed by the Board of Governors and represent the
public; none may be an officer, director, employee, or stockholder of any bank. Most
are public-spirited individuals, serving by reason of a sense of community responsi-
bility. Often a class C director is actively engaged in academic work. The Board of
Governors designates one class C director as chairman of -he local board and another
as deputy chairman. The chairman serves also as Federal Reserve agent, exercising
certain administrative duties connected with the issue of Federal Reserve notes.
B. BECKHART, supra note 33, at 45.
39. The requirements for member banks are summarized as follows:
National banks, which are chartered by the Comptroller of the Currency, an official
of the Department of the Treasury, are required by law to be members of the System.
Banks chartered by any of the 50 States may elect to become members if they meet
the requirements laid down by the Board of Governors. The member banks own all
of the stock of the Reserve Banks. However, ownership of that stock, which is a legal
requirement of membership, does not carry with it the usual attributes of control and
financial interest.
BOARD or GOVERNORS, supra note 33, at 19. Membership entails both obligations and benefits.
Obligations include maintaining sufficient reserves either as deposits at the local Reserve Bank
or as cash in their own vaults, and compliance with all federal laws and regulations
promulgated by the Board of Governors. Id. at 20. The benefits of membership include the
use of Federal Reserve facilities for check clearing and wire transfers, and the ability to borrow
at the discount window of the Federal Reserve Banks. Id. at 20-23; see also B. BECKHART, supra
note 33, at 52-78 (outlining the services the Federal Reserve Banks provide to their clients and
the requirements for membership set forth by the Federal Reserve Act).
40. The stock requirements of member banks are summarized as follows:
Each member bank subscribes to an amount of stock in its own Federal Reserve bank
equal to 6 percent of its capital and surplus, actually paying in an amount equal to 3
percent. The balance is subject to call by the Board of Governors, but the prospect
that it will ever be demanded is very remote because the Reserve banks have little
need of the money. Stock ownership by a member bank is increased or decreased
from time to time as the bank augments or reduces its own capital and surplus. This
stock may not be transferred or used as collateral for loans.
B. BECKHART, supra note 33, at 44.
41. Since passage of the Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), nonmember banks have access to some of the
same services as member banks, including borrowing privileges, and also are subject to the
same reserve requirements. See § 103(b), 94 Stat. 132, 133-35.
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Congress established the Federal Reserve Banks to carry out the
day-to-day operations of the Federal Reserve System. Subject to control by
the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve Banks operate the discount
window through which member banks can borrow from their district
Federal Reserve Bank.42 The Federal Reserve Banks carry out other
open-market operations, 43 such as the purchase and sale of government
securities, that increase or decrease the funds available for banks to lend.
These banks also issue Federal Reserve notes, collect, clear, and transfer
funds, handle government debt and cash balances, and, in effect, serve as
principal fiscal agents for the United States Government.
Congress divided the country into twelve Federal Reserve Districts,
each with one principal bank. These banks were privately owned with
special charters. 44 Each of the twelve district banks was to have twenty-five
branches to serve particular areas within its district. Congress's purposes in
establishing a system of regional branches were threefold: to ensure that all
parts of the United States would have access to the Federal Reserve; to offer
representation of regional needs in monetary policy and economic devel-
42. The Board of Governors describes the purpose of the discount window as:
The provision of Federal Reserve credit to member banks-at the initiative of the
borrowing bank but subject to administrative constraints-serves essentially as (1) a
source of temporary funds to help with large, unexpected deposit or portfolio
adjustments that individual banks sometimes encounter and (2) a safety valve for
member banks as a group during periods of monetary restraint. In addition, through
lending operations the Federal Reserve provides somewhat longer-term credit to
member banks that lack ready access to national money markets when these banks
need help in covering recurring seasonal needs for funds. On rare occasions of
emergency, when members confront urgent needs for liquefying their assets (such as
needs arising from, say, unexpected developments in the local, regional, or national
economy), they may obtain credit on a longer than temporary basis. Finally,
nonmembers may borrow from the Federal Reserve under unusual and exigent
circumstances in the financial markets, but at an interest rate that is above the
discount rate available to hmember banks.
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, supra note 33, at 70; see also id. at 70-78 (describing operation of discount
window process); B. BECKHART, supra note 33, at 82 (same).
43. One analyst describing open-market operations writes:
mhe most important instruments of credit policy in the United States, are conven-
tionally defined as those credit activities initiated by a central bank. They include the
purchase and sale of government obligations and other securities, bankers' acceptan-
ces, and commercial paper. They may also include purchases and sales of foreign
exchange and gold, although such purchases do not usually result from the initiative
of the central bank itself.
Central banks' open-market operations are often distinguished from lending
operations, which allegedly result from the initiative of borrowers, including com-
mercial banks, other financial institutions, and the government. It is not easy to
determine initiative in all instances. Financial institutions may be forced to borrow
from a central bank because it has engaged in open-market operations-has sold
securities-or because it has increased reserve requirements. The initiative of the
borrower then results from the initiating action of the central bank.
B. BEcR- RT, supra note 33, at 490-91; see also id. at 490-94 (discussing open-market operations
in other countries); BOARD OF GovERNORs, supra note 33, at 49-67 (discussing open-market
operations).
44. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 221-522 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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opment; and to allow private individuals to participate in the banking
system. 45 This plan also represented a compromise between members of
Congress who favored complete control by the Board of Governors and
members who favored the existing arrangement of private dominance.
46
With the onset of the Depression, it was clear that greater centraliza-
tion of monetary policy was necessary. The 1935 Banking Act 47 vested
centralized authority over monetary policy in the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC).48 Today the FOMC is composed of all seven members
of the Board of Governors as well as five of the twelve regional bank
presidents. The president of the New York Fed holds a permanent position
on the FOMC, and the other eleven bank presidents fill the remaining four
places on a rotating basis. 49
The establishment of the FOMC supplanted the authority of the
regional banks to determine the availability of reserves to the banking
system. The FOMC deprived the regional banks of virtually all indepen-
dent power to make policy and left their boards of directors with only
symbolic authority. The 1935 Banking Act did not, however, change the
legal structure of the regional banks. They remained privately owned, had
boards of directors, and continued to pay dividends to their shareholding
member banks.
Today the responsibility of the Federal Reserve Board is, simply put,
twofold: it guides the nation's monetary policy, and it regulates banks.
45. See W. MELTON, supra note 25, at 8 (citing H. WiLus, TIE FEDERAL RESERVE: A STUDY OF
BANKING SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (1915)).
46. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 522 & n.21 (D.D.C. 1986)
(citing 79 CONG. REC. 11,778, 13,705-06 (1935)), affd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988).
47. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 648 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 263
(1982)).
48. Id. at tit. II, § 205, 49 Stat. 703, 705 (amending § 12A of Federal Reserve Act of 1913,
ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1915)) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 263 (1982)).
49. The constitutionality of the Federal Open Market Committee was recently challenged
in Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd on other
grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 (1988). Senator John
Melcher challenged the process by which the five "Reserve Bank Members" of the FOMC are
selected. Melcher contended that the process violated the appointments clause, art. II, § 2, cl.
2 of the United States Constitution, which requires that officers of the United States be
appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Mecher, 644 F. Supp. at 512. The boards of directors of the several Federal Reserve Banks
elect their presidents who are then eligible for a position on tha FOMC. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.
§ 263(a) (1982)). The D.C. District Court held that the Reserve Bank members were neither
officers of the United States that required appointment by the President and confirmation by
the Senate, nor "inferior officers" that were appointed by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. Id. at 518-20. The court further held that Congress could delegate to
private individuals some of its article 1, § 8 powers, i.e., coinage of money and regulation of
its value, specifically including the purchase and sale of obligations. Id. at 522-23. Because the
President appoints seven of the thirteen members of the FOMC with the advice and consent
of the Senate, the court reasoned, Congress did not give the decisive vote in monetary policy
to private persons. Id. at 523 & n.26. The D.C. Circuit affirmed but, relying on a previous
decision involving the FOMC, found that the District Court should have dismissed the suit on
grounds of equitable discretion. Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding similar challenge to voting powers of FOMC "improperly interfere[dJ with
legislative processes")).
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Although the Fed exercises exclusive jurisdiction over monetary policy, it
shares regulatory authority over 15,000 United States banks with various
agencies, particularly the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and state bank superintendents. 50 Although vari-
ous agencies possess regulatory responsibilities, the Fed maintains exten-
sive authority over banks in the United States:
In its regulatory role, the Board exercises functions related to
both the Federal Reserve banks and the member banks. With
respect to the Federal Reserve banks, the Board can examine
these institutions, require reports from them, set the discount
rates they allow their borrowing members, and regulate their
check clearing operations. It also has complete supervision over
relations between a Federal Reserve bank and any foreign bank.
In regard to member banks the Board examines them and
receives periodic reports (although the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency has the prime responsibility for the examination of national
banks, as opposed to state member banks where the prime
responsibility for examinations rests with the Federal Reserve
Board). Under the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
50. As one commentator has noted, the structure of the Federal Reserve System is
"bizarre" and without "parallel among central banks abroad or among other domestic
agencies." W. MELTON, supra note 25, at 4, 7. To complicate matters even further, the
jurisdictional overlap among the various federal governmental agencies that regulate banks
and banking policy also may be described as "bizarre." Regulatory agencies that have some
control over depository institutions include: (1) the Federal Reserve Board; (2) the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency; (3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); (4) the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA); and (5) the National Credit Union Share Insurance
Fund (NCUSIF).
On August 9, 1989, President George Bush signed into law the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery & Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 1989 U.S. CODE CONo. & AMuN.
NEws (101 Stat.) 183 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§1437, 1441a), which abolished the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC). The Act created two new agencies: the Oversight Board; and the Resolution Trust
Corporation. Id.
This regulatory hodgepodge is rendered even more complicated by the fact that almost all
banks in the United States are regulated by some state or federal governmental authority.
Which authority prevails is'determined by little other than historic justification as to which
authorities these shall be. As Melton notes:
State-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System are
regulated by their states' banking commissions. The Fed itself, however, supervises
state-chartered banks that are members of the Fed. (In addition, the Fed regulates
bank holding companies.) Nationally chartered banks are regulated by the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Similarly, thrift institutions with state charters are supervised
on the state level, while those with national charters are subject to the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. Money market mutual funds, which provide services similar in
some respects to bank deposits, are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. U.S. branches of foreign banks fit into this scheme depending on whether
they are state chartered (and supervised by state banking commissions) or nationally
chartered (and supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency). In addition, to
ensure uniformity of regulation, the Federal Reserve has residual supervisory
authority over all U.S. operations of foreign banks. As a regulatory hodgepodge, this
stands comparison to any.
W. MELTON, supra note 25, at 6. It is not the purpose of this Article to reform or untangle the
multiple political compromises that have, over time, contributed to the crazy-quilt structure
and regulatory landscape within which the Fed operates.
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Monetary Control Act of 1980, the Federal Reserve Board is
authorized to require nonmember depository institutions, includ-
ing savings and loan associations, savings banks, and credit
unions, to supply reports to the Board on their assets and
liabilities. The Board also has considerable regulatory powers
through its administration of the Bank Holding Company Act.5'
The Board of Governors exercises its extensive regulatory authority
relatively free from executive and congressional controls. The President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the seven members of
the Board for fourteen-year terms.5 2 These terms are staggered so that one
member's term expires every two years, thus limiting the number of
appointments a President can make in a single term. Members are
removable by the President only for cause.53
More significantly, the Board does not depend on congressional
appropriations for its operating funds. The Board has the power to levy an
assessment against Federal Reserve Banks to supp2y funds for its operating
expenses, and the Board has complete discretion to determine how these
funds will be spent. 54 Since the Federal Reserve Act excludes these
assessments from "appropriated funds,"55 they are not part of the federal
budget and, thus, not subject to congressional review. The Board monitors
its own finances through audits by respected private firms and in-house
procedures. The Board's exception from the requirement to obtain ad-
vance approval from the Office of Management and Budget or any other
federal agency prior to testifying before or submitting legislative proposals
to Congress further attests to the Fed's extensive independence. 56 Com-
pared to most regulatory agencies, even independent commissions, the Fed
is remarkably free from direct political control. 57
Courts, of course, can review some of the Fed's regulatory actions, but
play no role in reviewing monetary policy; the Board's decisions in this area
are essentially unreviewable. In addition, many of the Fed's regulatory
51. T. DE SAINT PHAu.E, supra note 7, at 4. The Depositor'i Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 248 (1982) and scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.
For a discussion of the Bank Holding Company Act, see Part 1I infra.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
53. Id. § 242. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the
chairman of the board to a four-year term. Id. Therefore, the Chairman is likely to be more
vulnerable to presidential pressure. Since the chairman exercises power on a daily basis, he or
she is much more responsible for Board policy than the individual members.
54. Id. § 243.
55. Id. § 244.
56. Id. § 250.
57. The Fed, however, is subject to the checks in the Fedcral Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1982), and the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b (1982). Also, many of the Fed's regulatory decisions are subject to congressional
oversight and judicial review. It must submit to Congress twice-annual reports that review
developments in the national economy, state objectives in monetary policy, and discuss the
relationship between the Fed's objectives and the objectives of Congress and the President.
The Fed also must submit to Congress an annual report on the Board's operations. 12 U.S.C.
§ 225a (1982). Similarly, the chairman and governors frequendy speak before congressional
committees about the condition of the banking system, pending banking legislation, the
federal budget, economic legislation, and general economic matters. Information presented at
these hearings, including statistical reports, is usually summarized in the monthly FEDsERL
RESERVE BULLETIN.
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activities are far too discretionary for courts to review in any significant way.
As we shall see, a great deal of informality surrounds the Fed's administra-
tion of the Bank Holding Company Act and the applications and negotia-
tion process that this Act necessitates. The informality, coupled with most
applicants' need for prompt decisions, often undercuts any significant
oversight role that a court might play by reviewing the substance of the
Board's regulatory decisions. 58 The relative degree of independence with
which the Board exercises many of its regulatory responsibilities often
exacerbates the conflicts that can arise in particular regulatory contexts
when the Fed imposes conditions or informally extracts so-called "voluntary
commitments."59 To appreciate fully the Fed's use of conditions and
commitments and the conflict that certain kinds of conditions can generate,
it is necessary to examine both the evolution and application of the Bank
Holding Company Act.
II. THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY Acr
Perhaps the Fed's most important regulatory role is its implementation
of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA). This Act has two fundamental
purposes. First, it is intended to preserve competition within the banking
industry. It, therefore, attempts to prevent bank holding companies from
overly rapid expansion that can undermine effective competition among
banks in local and regional markets. 60 Second, the Act is based on the
premise that there should be a separation between "the business of
banking" and commerce.6 1 Thus, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the extent to which bank holding companies (BHCs) can engage
in "nonbank" activities. 62 To ensure the stability of the banking industry,
the Act assumes that some risks are inappropriate for banks to take. The
Act also assumes that easy access to bank funds by companies engaged in
pursuits unrelated to banking should be prohibited because, in addition to
the risks involved, such access may provide these companies with an
inappropriate competitive edge.63
58. But see Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.
361,374-75 (1986) (finding Board acted contrary to provisions of Bank Holding Company Act
in promulgating its definition of "bank").
59. See Part III infra.
60. See Formation and Powers of National Banking Associations-A Legal Primer, 1983: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-16 (1983)
(report of Raymond Natter, American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service)
[hereinafter Formation and Powers of National Banking Associations]; see also Bank Holding
Company Act 1966 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 7, 80 Stat. 236, 237; H.R. REP. No.
609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).
61. Formation and Powers of National Banking Associations, supra note 60, at 5-46; see Citicorp
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 589 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
929 (1979); Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 533
F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1976), modified on reh'g, 558 F.2d 729, cert. denied, 453 U.S. 904 (1978); 12
U.S.C. § 1843 (1982) (section 4 of Bank Holding Company Act); see also H.R. REP. No. 609,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1955).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1982).
63. H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 16 (1955).
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Controversy over what is or should be the business of banking
challenges the rationales for banking regulations. 64 Changes in data
processing and communications technology have created a new financial
services industry. "These new methods have revolutionized the business,
and created new businesses and new products. Money market funds,
central asset accounts, and universal life policies would have been impos-
sible before modern data processing and communication technologies. '65
These new services raise questions about just what "the business of
banking" in fact is. Is a line of credit provided by one's local supermarket a
form of "banking?" Is a supermarket a bank? New products and new
services have created what can be called financial services holding compa-
nies. These new institutions elude the Fed's jurisdiction, but nonetheless
are very competitive with the commercial banks and BHCs under the Fed's
control. Because BHCs need to compete effectively with the new financial
service holding companies, the Fed faces enormous pressure to enlar-
ge-through the bank holding company concept-the scope of activities in
which BHCs can engage. 66
As we shall see, in examining the evolution and regulation of BHCs, a
modern version of the perennial struggle between market and political
forces appears. Market pressures have always pushed BHCs in new
directions and the flexibility provided by the bank holding company
concept often has allowed the kind of organizational innovation necessary
64. See Macey & Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88
CoLwN. L. REv. 1153, 1159-60 (1988). In addition to advocating that banks should be allowed
to diversify, the authors suggest eliminating deposit insurance because "[i]n a world without
deposit insurance, depositors would demand that banks refrain from engaging in risky
investment strategies or else demand that they be compensated in the form of a higher interest
rate for the extra risk." Id. at 1165; see also Butler & Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 677, 688 (1988) (arguing regulatory protection of some
well-organized economic interest group from potential competition provides the only basis for
some current restrictions on bank activity); Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of
Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REv. 301, 305 (1987) (private sector monitoring
activity as a supplement to federal monitoring would produce more efficient oversight of
banking activities); Garten, Banking On the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4
YALE J. ON REG. 129, 140 (1986) (depositors able to make informed decisions because
information about the operation and financial condition of banks is available and trustworthy).
Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline By Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical
Arguments, 5 YALEJ. ON REG. 215, 217 (1988) (failure of one bank no longer causes a general run
because FDIC and FSLIC provide overall public confidence in the banking system); Macey &
Miller, supra, at 1169-70 ("expanding the scope of permissible bank activities may reduce bank
risk by enabling banks to diversify into investments with a low covariance to traditional bank
activities"); Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 12 (1987) (when
federal deposit insurance is available, the large increase in bank failures in recent years has not
resulted in any significant loss of confidence in the banking system); Smith & Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. OF Fu,. EcoN. 117, 118-19 (1979)
(market-driven mechanisms can work for depositors' control over excessive risk-taking by bank
managers).
65. Sellers, Technology and the Future of the Financial Services Industry, 7 TEcH. IN Soc'v 1, 2
(1985).
66. See G. FISCHER, THE MODERN BANK HOLDING ComPANY: DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION AND
PERFORMANCE 97-98 (1986) (Board recommends allowing BHCs to engage in broader range of
activities); id. at 157-62 (pressure to allow insurance activities); id. (entry of unregulated
institutions into the financial service industry); id. at 287 ("a whole new group of 'non-BHC'
BHCs are moving into what many thought was commercial banking territory").
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to meet new market demands. Overlap, if not total congruence, between
the demands of the market, as perceived by the regulated, and the political
goals of the regulators often provided enough flexibility to accommodate
both market and regulatory perspectives. Thus, the bank holding company
device was able to achieve substantial product and geographic diversifica-
tion; for this ability the government exacted a regulatory price. To wit,
product and geographic expansion could not undermine competition, nor
jeopardize the safety of the depositor by allowing banks or BHCs to go too
far afield when it came to "the business of banking." Given the structure of
the post-New Deal banking industry, this regulatory price was not per-
ceived as particularly high.
These "regulatory goals"-or, depending on one's perspective, these
"regulatory barriers" to competition-are now subject to intense scrutiny.
One line of argument is that new data processing and communications
technologies have created such a new and different financial services
industry that the statutory goals expressed in the Bank Holding Company
Act and its amendments are undercut substantially in at least two interre-
lated ways. First, changes in technologies allow new activities that the old
acts simply do not cover. Thus, even if one agrees with the BHCA's basic
goals-protection of competition and the need to ensure bank safe-
ty-these goals cannot be realized in the new industry and the new entities
that now exist. Second, these regulatory rationales are steeped in New Deal
conceptions and fears, as well as a conception of an industry that no longer
exists.
For example, the technological advances that have allowed growth in
the use of credit cards have made the provisions of the McFadden Act6 7
functionally irrelevant. The McFadden Act was designed to prohibit
interstate branch banking by preventing national banks from establishing
branches across state lines.68 Yet Wallace Sellers has aptly noted:
[M]ajor money center banks have offices in nearly every state.
These take the form of loan production offices, mortgage pro-
cessing and service centers, and related activities. Although they
may not take deposits, they perform a variety of other banking
functions. In addition, every major bank is a sponsor of one or
more credit cards. Since credit cards are not limited by state
boundaries, the McFadden Act restrictions become more irrele-
vant with every passing day. We may not have interstate branch-
ing, but we certainly have interstate banking.6 9
Similarly, financial institutions as well as financial subsidiaries of nonfinan-
cial firms can compete with BHCs without Board restrictions. These
so-called "non-BHC BHCs" have sidestepped the BHCA's requirement
that nonbank activities of BHCs be closely related to the business of
banking. This loophole was available to domestic financial institutions
before passage of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,70 but the
67. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
68. See id. § 36(c).
69. Sellers, supra note 65, at 4.
70. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of 2 & 12
U.S.C.). Congress intended to eliminate nonbank bank loopholes in the BHCA, while giving
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globalization of financial markets has created new entities that continue to
circumvent the requirements of the BHCA.71 Closing loopholes by extend-
ing regulation within the United States does not and cannot prevent
competition from abroad.
The limitations that a global market places on domestic banking
legislation, and the ability of market forces and new technology to render
statutes increasingly irrelevant or obsolete, are at the heart of many issues
presented to the Board. These issues also are at the heart of many of the
Congress time to consider new legislation for the financial services industry and encouraging
the financial services industry to participate in the drafting of laws that affect federally insured
depository institutions. S. REP. No. 19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AwmIN. NEws 492. The loopholes frustrated the policy of separating banking from
commerce, a policy that ensures equal availability of credit and minimizes the concentration of
financial power. Id.
71. In their criticism of the Competitive Equality Banking Act, some Senators found that
the Act's provisions were "inconsistent with the need to modernize our system and stay
competitive in the face of the increasing internationalization of capital markets." S. REP. No.
19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (dissenting views of Senators Garn, Hecht, Gramm, Bond, and
Chaffee), reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & AtMiN. NEWS 568. The Senators believed that if
a " 'protectionistic' model" is applied to domestic financial institutions, "the marketplace,
technology, and consumer tastes will move beyond. The victim would be one more U.S.
industry that would not-or in this case could not-evolve to meet the competition." Id. at 95,
1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 584 (quoting James Baker, Secretary of the Treasury
Department).
The popular press also noticed this situation. One analyst has called for global regulation of
securities markets because, first, "as much money moves around the globe through stocks and
bonds these days as through the commercial banking system .... Second, in the United States
we cannot adequately police foreign issuers in our own markets without agreements with
overseas authorities on procedures for investigation and enforcement." Garten, We Need Global
Regulations for Stocks, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1988, § 3, at F3, col. 1. This analyst also warns that
the global equity business eventually could be dominated by 15 to 20 international firms.
Trading as we now know it could be replaced by deals conducted "within and between these
giants, computer to computer." Id. § 3, at F3, col. 4. He suggests that
regulation of the markets might start with tighter supervision of these global firms. In
fact, a regulatory focus on intermediaries could be more important than the
traditional emphasis on markets. The standard priority of securities regulation-pro-
tection for "the little guy"-might also have to be rethought in light of the increasing
dominance, on an international scale at least, of the larger nstitutional investors.
Id. According to another commentator,
[dleregulation of banking and the entry into different parts of the banking business
of less-regulated American financial institutions such as brokerage firms and insur-
ance companies have placed what was once a highly protected industry under intense
competitive pressure. Adding to the pressure is the rising competition from less
regulated Japanese and European banks and finandal concerns, which are often
several times the size of those in the United States .... While 30 years ago seven of
the world's largest banks were American, today only one-Citicorp-ranks in the top
25. Of the top 10 banks in the world, seven are Japanese .... As Congress considers
the regulatory and antitrust problems that will inevitably arise, the issue will not
necessarily be whether Chase Manhattan can compete with Bankers Trust, but
whether the American financial system is competitive with the Japanese or the West
German giants.
Nash, In the Darwinian Age of Global Finance Only Megabanks May Survive, N.Y. Times, June 26,
1988, § 4, at E6, col. 2. This same analyst suggests that too much deregulation is responsible
for the current thrifts crisis, and that when an industry is deregulated the government must
increase its policing mechanism. See Nash, Who to Thank for the Crisis in the Thrift Industry, N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1988, § 3, at F14, col. 3.
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calls for comprehensive congressional reform in this area.72 As one
commentator notes:
[T]he BHC as we have known it for more than a half century is in
its twilight years. The era of the financial holding company (FHC)
is now upon us. The BHC should quite naturally evolve into the
FHC of the future. But what should and will occur may be two
different things. Unless it is recognized that banks are in the
financing business, and they are given the authority to meet their
competitors over the broad range of financing activity on an equal
basis, a list of leading FHG's of the 1990's will carry few familiar
names from the domestic BHG's of the 1980's.73
As this quotation suggests, the BHC acts are undercut in a second
related sense. In addition to easily sidestepped regulatory purposes, the
BHCA addresses concerns, such as providing special protection for
depositors,74 that are no longer at the center of the newly evolved industry.
The following sections provide some sense of the evolution of bank
holding company regulation and an explanation of why, in a global and
highly competitive context, the evolutionary limits of that Act may have
been reached. Moreover, this brief history highlights a long standing
battle-the battle between regulatory political forces and market forces.
Agencies attempt to use their regulatory authority to carry out their
statutorily mandated political goals. The regulated read the same statutes,
but usually in a way that enables them to react legally to market forces to
which they must be responsive. When there is substantial congruence
between the market goals of the regulated and the political goals of the
regulators, or at least when all of the industry is subject to the same rules,
the regulatory regime is able to function smoothly. Problems begin to
emerge when market forces push in a significantly different direction than
the political goals of the governing statute. This tension between the
demands of the market and the goals of the regulators is exacerbated when
those who are regulated must compete with those who are not. This kind of
mismatch is especially acute when there is global competition from entities
that are theoretically impossible to control by domestic regulation, no
matter how cleverly an agency is able to extend its jurisdictional reach.
Thus, the perennial battle between market and political forces is most
intense when regulatory conditions change and the regulated find them-
selves in competition with new unregulated entities that play by a very
different set of rules.
It is within this context of change that the issues of administrative
discretion examined in Part III take on particular significance. To under-
stand fully both the use and limits of an agency's conditioning powers, it is
important to develop the changing context in which administrative agen-
72. See supra note 71.
73. G. FISCHER, supra note 66, at 288.
74. T. DE SAI\T PHALLE, supra note 7, at 9 (arguing historical justifications for special
protections of depositors need re-examination); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 1195
(arguing uninsured depositors should "provide healthy, not a destructive, monitoring function
on banks").
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cies function. The next three sections shall examine the evolution of the
Bank Holding Company Act and then look at its application to the new
financial services industry.
A. The Years Prior to Federal Bank Holding Company Regulation
Bank holding companies have "surprisingly little in common with each
other apart from their Bank Holding Company (BHC) designation." 75
Before exploring the intricacies of the legal form of BHCs, it is useful to
note a number of related organizational forms that preceded the bank
holding company approach and to set forth the basic regulatory policy that
underlies earlier state and federal attempts to regulate these diverse legal
entities.
Banking is subject to entry restrictions. Express authority is required
from either a state or the federal government before any entity can enter
into the business of banking. National banks obtain the approval of the
federal government through the Comptroller of the Currency. State banks
obtain the approval of the state. The resulting state or national bank will be
supervised by the chartering authority-its primary regulator.7 6 A bank
can, however, convert from one type of charter to the other if it obtains
permission from the new regulator. The regulated entities can always try to
find a regulator more accommodating to their needs. Thus, the dual system
of state and federal regulation checks any excess regulation that may
develop."
Banking entry restrictions of various forms were developed for two
fundamental reasons: (1) to protect depositors, because banks are, above
all, the custodians of "other people's money,"78 and (2) to limit competition.
Highly competitive industries are characterized by unacceptable rates of
withdrawals and failures for the kind of safety and stability necessary for
consumer confidence in the banking system.79 Concern about consumer
confidence has resulted in various attempts to control banks' competitive
urges to set up branch banks or to engage in what was called chain or group
banking.
Branch banking involves only one bank, but more than one banking
office. In contrast to branching, chains or groups of banks include at least
two affiliated but separately chartered banks. Thus, in states that allow
branching, members of chains or group systems could be either single- or
multiple-office institutions. Branch banking flourished in the United States
during the first third of the nineteenth century. At the same time, the
concept of the bank holding company began to emerge. As Professor
Fischer observes, "the common-law right of a bank to establish branches
was rarely questioned," and branching was "considered the natural means
75. G. FISCHER, supra note 66, at 4.
76. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HorsTRA L. REv. 1133, 1139 (1981).
77. Id. at 1141.
78. See generally L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How BANKERS USE IT (1914).
79. See Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 1142. But see Macey & Miller, supra note 64, at 1155,
1162 (allowing bank failures increases "society's stock of wealth" by ensuring money lent to the
best user and by driving "obsolete firms out of the industry").
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of providing banking facilities to smaller communities."80 Indeed, branch
banks themselves closely resembled bank holding companies because of the
autonomy exercised by branch offices. 81
Branching, however, was prohibited for national banks and restricted
in many states for state banks. Because it was difficult for banks to serve
rural areas, pressures gradually mounted to invent new ways to serve these
markets. Some states began to ease their branching restrictions, and the
Federal Government soon followed. Congress passed the McFadden Act in
1927, authorizing national banks to open a limited number of branches in
their home communities.8 2
An earlier response to branching limitations was multi-unit banking.
Multi-unit banking usually took the form of chain banking; that is, one
individual had common ownership in two or more separate banks. Thus, the
entities were neither branches, nor completely unrelated unit banks. Before
1900 these chains were limited to a few banks. At the turn of the century,
however, multi-unit chain banking began to flourish. The kinds of forces
that encouraged widespread multi-unit banking remain relevant today.8 3
Quoting from an issue of theJournal of Business, published around the turn
of the century, Professor Fischer noted:
The growth of population and increasing congestion of traffic
made for rapid development of banking in the outlying districts.
The downtown banks could hardly but look with envy at the
lucrative savings bank business that thus developed. With branch
banking prohibited, the only solution was to buy into established
banks in the new territory or establish new ones.84
Many doubted the wisdom of this approach. Relying on the traditional
reasons for imposing entry restrictions on banks, opponents of chain
banking stressed the sanctity of the unit bank concept. They were not
unsuccessful. While federal law remained silent on this issue, some states
passed laws disallowing ownership of bank stock by corporations, but most
states simply prohibited the purchase of shares of a state bank's stock by
another state-chartered bank. BHCs fell outside most existing regulatory
schemes because a holding company was not considered a bank per se.8 5
Beginning around 1920, holding companies became the primary vehicle by
80. G. FISCHER, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 4 (1961).
81. Id. As Professors Jessee and Seelig note:
[B]ranches of the First Bank of the United States not only had their own directors and
presidents but also functioned autonomously. Several large state banks also had many
of the characteristics of holding companies. However, as a result of the Civil War and
the National Bank Act ... few branch banks remained in operation after the 1860s.
Unit banks almost completely dominated the American banking structure as the
twentieth century began.
M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTER 7 (1977).
82. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1982)).
83. G. FISCHER, supra note 66, at 7 ("Although over 70 years have passed since these systems
were organized, the reasons for their formation are not without parallels in the 1980s.").
84. Id. at 8 (quoting Thomas, Concentration in Banking Controls through Interlocking
Directorates as Typified by Chicago Banks, 6 J. oF Bus. 9 (1933).
85. M. JESSEE & S. SEEUG, supra note 81, at 6.
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which state branch banking restrictions were circumvented; a single BHC
with ten unit banks could easily substitute for a single bank with nine
branches.8 6
BHCs were similar to chain banks in concept, but different in crucial
ways. Corporate giants holding great financial power tended to control
BHCs, rather than individuals or small groups of investors. In such
corporations, stockholders were widely dispersed, professional manage-
ment made decisions, and the entity typically included at least one
metropolitan bank. Two characteristics thus set BHCs apart from chain
groups: a metropolitan lead bank and a form of centralized management.8 7
In the 1920s a variety of reasons contributed to the growing popularity
of this organizational form.88 Fischer notes four in particular: (1) the need
for rural bank expansion and reform; (2) the general merger movement of
the 1920s; (3) bankers' fear that their correspondent business would be lost
to expanding holding companies if their own bank holding companies were
not formed; and (4) the bull market of the 1920s.89 One can add a fifth
reason as well: bankers used the BHC to avoid branching restrictions, but
since they anticipated more liberal branching laws, they also wanted to be
well-positioned for the new market they envisioned. They thus sought to
acquire the banks that they believed would ultimately become branches.
These factors led to the essentially uncontrolled growth of bank
holding companies during the 1920s. This growth did not go unnoticed, or
fail to concern some observers. 90 The stock market crash of 1929, however,
quickly dwarfed these concerns. As the Depression spread, public attention
focused less on the expansion of bank holding companies and more on the
nonbanking acquisitions of those companies. Congressional investigators
who examined loans that various types of banks made prior to the 1929
collapse concluded that the factors that caused BHCs to expand also played
a significant part in the kinds of speculation that led to the 1929 crash.91
Four bills designed to limit holding company actions were introduced in
86. Ginsburg, supra note 76, at 1156.
87. Id.
88. Holding companies "controlled 2,103 banks at year-end 1929. These banks constituted
8 percent of the nation's total number of banks and operated more than 12 percent of all
banking offices." M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 81, at 6."
89. G. FISCHER, supra note 66, at 157-62.
90. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD SYsrEmi BOARD OF GOVERMORS, ANNUA. REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1927, at
31, quoted in M, JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 81, at 7. The report stated:
Bank holding companies have been organized in increasing numbers to operate
extensively in the field of banking, not simply as investment agencies, but specifically
in individual instances to acquire control of corporately independent banking
institutions through stock ownership and to exercise this centralized control in
effecting bank mergers; in extending identical or virtually single corporate control
over companies operating as subsidiaries in special fields of banking; and in building
up chain systems embracing in individual instances banking institutions operating
under national and state charters in several states.
Id.
91. Branch, Chain, and Group Banking: Hearings on H.R. 141 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 873-77 (1930) (statement of E. Decker, represen-
tative of Northwest Bancorporation).
837 [1989]
USE AND LIMITS OF CONDITIONS
1930, but none was passed.92 Not until 1956 did a federal legislative
coalition pass the Bank Holding Company Act.
An important precursor of this Act, however, was the Banking Act of
1933-the Glass-Steagall Act.93 Although the few sections the Act con-
tained pertaining to group banking had little impact, the Act nevertheless
represented the first federal attempt to regulate bank holding companies.
These provisions were, in large part, a partial response to the fundamental
concerns that had always formed the regulatory justification for entry
restrictions. At the hearings that preceded the Glass-Steagall Act, many
participants believed the Act would threaten the existence of small banks.94
Similarly, participants noted the substantial potential for conflicts of
interest that might arise when a bank holding company controls nonbank-
ing interests.95 Indeed, Congressman Letts asked Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Roy A. Young of the Federal Reserve Board the following
probing questions:
I have noticed a tendency on the part of banking institutions to
go into many lines of business-the handling of securities; the
handling of mortgage business; agencies for the sale of real
estate-to the point that I understand the Transamerica Corpo-
ration has announced that it has the necessary funds to put over
any enterprise that they wish ....
... Is there danger that a policy of this kind will lead to the point
where financial institutions will serve themselves and their affili-
ates and not the public?
. . . In other words, will they compel men in business as
individuals or in a corporate capacity, to play hand in hand with
the financial groups, in order to get necessary accommodations?
... My concern is in regard to the powers that may be acquired
through the policies of holding companies that sit in back of the
screen and control the activities of the banking institutions in a
community and many other lines of industry. It is conceivable it
may even go to the point of involving the control of companies
that are engaged in the distribution of our foods and other
necessities of life.96
The Act did not deal very effectively with these concerns. It did, however,
require holding companies to meet certain conditions before they could
obtain a permit to vote in the selection of directors of affiliated banks.
92. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG.
& A.mIN. NEws 2482,.2484-86.
93. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
94. Branch, Chain, and Group Banking: Hearings on H.R. 141 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1930) (statement ofJohn W. Pole, Comptroller
of the Currency).
95. Id. at 67 (statement of John W. Pole, Comptroller of the Currency) (comments of
Congressman Letts).
96. Id. at 479-80.
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These conditions required the holding company to agree to: (1) allow
federal officials to examine the holding company's subsidiary banks; (2)
completely cease from the investment business within five years from the
date of the Act's application; (3) hold a certain percentage of marketable
assets other than bank stock; and (4) submit financial reports and declare
dividends only out of actual net earnings.97
The Glass-Steagall Act proved inadequate when it came to bank
holding companies. BHCs were covered only if they controlled at least one
Federal Reserve member bank.98 Thus, BHCs could avoid the Act if all of
their bank subsidiaries were nonmember institutions. Moreover, the Act
did not affect the ability of BHCs to expand or acquire additional
nonbanking interests. Thus, the Act required no consideration of the effect
on competition that bank holding company expansion might have.
The Act's limited reach did not seem to matter much during the 1930s.
This was a period of retrenchment for BHCs. Bank failures reduced the
number of BHCs and there was little economic incentive to form new ones.
Moreover, the federal government was increasingly hostile to these orga-
nizational forms and the future of multi-unit banking was in serious doubt.
At one point, President Roosevelt essentially sought to eliminate all holding
companies; bills to that effect were introduced. 99 Even the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors began to play a much more active regulatory role
vis-4-vis existing holding companies. In 1948 the :Board initiated antitrust
proceedings against Transamerica Corporation,100 the largest BHC then in
existence. Although the Board ultimately lost, the case focused attention on
the economic power concentrated in the Transamerica Corporation and
the difficulty under existing law to control companies like it.1° I
The threat of federal legislation arose for many reasons. Concerns
were expressed over the soundness and safety of group banking as a whole
and the problems of regulatory coordination. As early as 1929, Comptroller
John Pole noted before the House Banking and Currency Committee:
97. M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 81, at 8 (citing Banking Act of 1933, ch 89, 48 Stat.
162).
98. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 2, 48 Stat. 162-63 (1933).
99. See infra text accompanying note 104.
100. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 901 (1953).
101. G. FISCHER, supra note 66, at 138. In 1949 economic incentives also had sparked new
interest in BHCs.
Although there was negligible expansion in group banking from 1933 to 1948,
considerable growth of these systems occurred from 1948 through 1956 .... Just as
in the 1920s, there was an increasing amount of merger activity in other fields and a
very good market for the shares of leading financial institutions. The movement of
population and industry again raised problems for banks. This time, however, it had
been mainly the city bank which found that it was losing its customers to the suburban
institution. While the primary causes of the earlier expansion of group banking were
the speculative mood of the 1920s and the extremely poor condition of many rural
banks, the fundamental element in the growth of group banking in the early 1950s
was the threat of federal legislation. It was feared that regulations would severely
affect the merger activity of bank holding companies.
Id. at 22.
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Where a group is composed of both state and national banks, as
well as of other types of financial institutions, it becomes practi-
cally impossible for any supervising governmental official to
ascertain authoritatively and accurately the financial condition of
the group as a whole. Each corporation in the group is an
independent legal entity, some responsible to both state and
national governments, and this creates a situation in which the
public is not sufficiently protected, insofar as it can be protected
by governmental authority. 10 2
He went on to suggest that control should be consolidated in one regulatory
body.10
In addition to lack of effective control, legislation proposed by the
Roosevelt Administration focused on the "great economic power" wielded
by holding companies. In a special message to Congress in 1938, President
Roosevelt stated:
It is hardly necessary to point out the great economic power that
might be wielded by a group which may succeed in acquiring
domination over banking resources in any considerable area of
the country. That power becomes particularly dangerous when it
is exercised from a distance and notably so when effective control
is maintained without the responsibilities of complete ownership.
We have seen the multiplied evils which have arisen from the
holding company system in the case of public utilities, where a
small minority ownership has been able to dominate a far-flung
system.
We do not want those evils repeated in the banking field, and
we should take steps now to see that they are not.
I recommend that the Congress enact.., legislation that will
effectively control the operation of bank holding companies;
prevent holding companies from acquiring control of any more
banks, directly or indirectly; prevent banks controlled by holding
companies from establishing any more branches; and make it
illegal for a holding company, or any corporation or enterprise in
which it is financially interested, to borrow from or sell securities
to a bank in which it holds stock.
I recommend that this bank legislation make provision for the
gradual separation of banks from holding company control or
ownership .... 104
The Federal Reserve Board itself echoed this theme. In hearings
before the Senate Banking Committee, Marriner Eccles, then Chairman of
the Federal Reserve, explained the need for legislation:
Accepted rules of law confine the business of banks to banking
and prohibit them from engaging in extraneous businesses such
102. Id. at 139.
103. Id.
104. S. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 8-9 (1938).
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as owning and operating industrial and manufacturing concerns.
It is axiomatic that the lender and the borrower or potential
borrower should not be dominated or cont-olled by the same
management. In one exceptional situation, however, the corpo-
rate device has been used to gather under one management many
different and varied enterprises wholly unrelated to the conduct
of a banking business.
The problem of how far bank holding company systems should
be permitted to expand has long been of serious concern. There
is perhaps a greater need for a positive declaration of congres-
sional policy on this question than on any other phase of the
holding company problems. It is in this area that one of the
greatest potential evils of bank holding company operations
exists. That evil, which permits a holding company . . . to
dominate major portions of the banking facilities of particular
sections, is one which strikes at the heart of our traditional system
of competitive banking.105
He went on to note the size and power of the Transamerica Corporation
-41 banks, 619 banking offices in California, Nevada, Arizona, Oregon,
and Washington. 106 In addition, Transamerica Corporation controlled
various nonbanking companies. 10 7
When Congress failed to act, the Board brought its own action against
Transamerica Corporation under section 7 of the Clayton Act.'10 The
failure of this suit also helped stir the legislative fires. 10 9 In 1956 these
various legislative threats and the political coalitions that were forming
finally came to fruition. The legislative result was the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956.110
105. Providing for Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 829 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1947) (statement of
Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).
106. Id. at 22.
107. Id. at 24-32 (noting control of companies engaged in life, fire, automobile, and marine
insurance; fish canning and processing; frozen foods; castings; forging; diesel engines; food
processing machinery; power control equipment; kitchen tools; color cameras; and agricul-
tural equipment); see Natter, Legal Antecedents To T4e Bank Holding Company Act, Congressional
Research Service Paper, at 9 (June 4, 1986) (setting forth background in detail).
108. Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 901 (1953).
109. See Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liberalization of the Bank Holding
Company Act, 60 GEo. L.J. 1225, 1231 (1972).
110. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, §§ 1-12, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982)). This Act was amended in 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485,
§§ 1-14, 80 Stat. 236 (1966), and, most significantly, in 1970. Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, tit. I, §§ 101-05, 84 Stat. 1760-68. See Chase, supra
note 109, at 1228-36 (discussing historical background to 1970 amendments). It should be
noted that section 3(d) of the 1956 Act is often called the Douglas Amendment. That provision
was incorporated into the original Act during the Senate debate, see 102 CONG. REc. 5902, 6856
(1956), and it prohibited interstate acquisitions of banks by BHCs unless these acquisitions
were specifically authorized by the statutes of the state in which the bank is located.
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B. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
Participants in the hearings held on the bills that became the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 reiterated concerns over the adverse effects
of BHCs.111 The House report issued with the Bank Holding Company Act
noted that the holding company movement threatened the existence of
independent community banks, could result in monopolistic control of
credit, and enabled banks to sidestep branching restrictions on both state
and federal levels. Moreover, the holding company's nonbanking busi-
nesses could occupy a preferred position in obtaining credit that might not
be appropriate under traditional banking standards. 112
Despite these concerns, the bill that passed was by no means a radical
one. Congress did not view holding companies as "evil" or try to abolish
them. The BHCA of 1956 sought to control them. The purposes of the Act
were:
1) the maintenance of separate banking and commerce institu-
tions; 2) the preservation of a competitive atmosphere in banking
markets; 3) the prevention of concentration of economic power;
and 4) the protection of the states' right to select the way in which
banks were structured within their borders. 11s
111. For example, in hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
William McChesney Martin, then Chairman of the Fed, stated "[eixisting provisions of law
originally enacted in the Banking Act of 1933 have proved entirely inadequate to deal with the
special problems presented by bank holding companies." S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2483. Chairman Martin noted
two particular problems with bank holding companies. First, the unrestricted ability of BHCs
to acquire new banking units allows a single group of managers to control the banking facilities
in a particular area. Second, combinations of banking and nonbanking interests permit
depositors' money to be lent to nonbanking interests. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 16-17 (1955) (extending credit to affiliated
companies "is to the detriment of other competitive businesses in the community"). Similar
concerns were expressed on the Senate side.
Mr. MAn,..... . I believe the potential abuse in this field is the combination of
banking and nonbanking interests. You could not prove the extent to which there will
be a danger. I am not trying to take the holding company device and say it is no good,
but I can see quite a good deal of use for a bank holding company as to banks, but
when you start mixing it and putting it into the area of possibly empire building, then
I think you mix two functions that can lead to a great deal of trouble.
Senator DOUGLAS. The possibility of abuse depends almost in a direct ratio to the
degree of control the holding company has over bank facilities. If there are adequate
alternative sources of credit you cannot coerce people into using it, but if there are
not alternative sources of credit then you can use your control of credit to get control
over manufacturing, too.
Mr. MARTIN. That is right.
Senator DOUGLAS. So that you do go back to the other field of the bank holding
companies, namely, that they may get too large a share of control of credit within
many localities.
Mr. ROBERTSON. That is true.
Control of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 880, S. 2350, H.R. 6227 Before the Senate
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (1955).
113. M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 81, at 11.
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Section 2(a) of the Act defined a bank holding company as:
any company (1) which directly or indirectly owns, controls, or
holds with power to vote, 25 per centum or more of the voting
shares of each of two or more banks or of a company which is or
becomes a bank holding company ... or (2) which controls in any
manner the election of a majority of the directors of each of two
or more banks .... 114
By limiting application of the Act to companies controlling two or more
banks, the Act continued to exempt one-bank holding companies from
federal regulation. At the time the Act was passed, one-bank holding
companies were primarily small, closely held, family corporations or small
banks held by nonbanking corporations." 5 Specific exemptions from
coverage were also given for religious, charitable, and educational organi-
zations as well as certain investment companies." 6
The Act required all BHCs, as defined by the Act, to register with the
Board of Governors. Section 3(a) required Board approval of BHC
acquisition of more than five percent of any bank's voting shares. The Act
also required Board permission for the formation of a new holding
company, for nonbank company's acquisition of all or substantially all of
the assets of a bank, and for the merger of any two bank holding
companies. 17
Section 4 of the Act called for BHCs to divest themselves of nonbank-
ing affiliates within two years and to refrain from any future acquisition of
such enterprises." 8 The Act exempted from divestiture companies whose
activities were all in the financial, fiduciary, or insurance areas and which
the Board determined to be "so closely related to the business of banking or
of managing or of controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."" 9
114. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a)(1)-(2), 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1982)).
115. See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91ST CONG., lsr SEss., REPORT ON
THE GRoWTH OF UNREGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 6 (Comm. Print 1969).
116. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2(b)(2), 70 Stat. 133, repealed by Act of
July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 2, 80 Stat. 236.
117. Id. § 3(a)(1)-(4), 70 Stat. at 134 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982)).
In reviewing the applications of companies covered by the BHCA, the Board was to consider
the following factors:
(1) the financial history and condition of the company or... banks concerned; (2)
their (financial] prospects; (3) the character of their management; (4) the conve-
nience, needs, and welfare of the communities and the area concerned; (5) whether
the effect of the acquisition . . . would be to expand the size or extent of the bank
holding company system involved beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound
banking, the public interest, and the preservation of competition in the banking field.
Id. § 3(c), 70 Stat. at 135 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982)).
118. Id. at § 4(a)-(b), 70 Stat. at 135-36 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (Supp.
V 1987)).
119. Id. § 3(b), 70 Stat. at 137 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (Supp. V
1987). In addition, "cross-stream" lending by holding company affiliates to parent companies
specifically was prohibited. Id. § 6(a), 70 Stat. at 137 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1845, repealed by
Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 9, 80 Stat. 240).
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As Professors Jessee and Seelig have noted, this Act was, like most
pieces of legislation, a compromise. It satisfied neither those who feared the
power of bank holding companies nor those who opposed all types of
regulation. 12 0 In the Federal Reserve Board's first report to Congress two
years after passage of the Act, and in each of its Annual Reports thereafter,
the Board urged Congress "to subject a holding company to the provisions
of the 1956 act if it owned 25 percent or more of the stock of a single bank;
and to include not only corporations, business trusts, and the like, but also
long-term trusts" as well as firms previously exempted and operated for
religious, educational, or charitable purposes.' 2 ' Except for the expansion
of the definition of a BHC to include the ownership of a single bank,
Congress adopted these changes in 1966.122 In addition, Congress made
section 3(c) more specific concerning competitive effects, and repealed
section 6.123
The Board continued to urge Congress to extend coverage of the Act
to one-bank companies. The one-bank exemption caused a significant
increase both in the number of one-bank holding companies and the
diversity of the activities that they pursued.124 One-bank holding compa-
nies grew for the same reasons BHCs first developed. They allowed market
forces to sidestep regulatory forces. Indeed, changes in technology and
market dynamics greatly encouraged the growth of one-bank holding
companies.125 Competition for savings from other types of financial insti-
tutions and customer demands for services such as credit cards, record
keeping, and computer services all combined to provide strong incentives
for expansion. 26 "Throughout the 1960s, competition for savings from
other types of financial institutions had grown so intense, and technological
development had so changed the nature of banking, that the generic
holding company was a logical outgrowth of failure to include the one-bank
holding company under the 1956 Act.' 27 Pressure, however, continued to
build to include one-bank holding companies within the purview of the Act.
The position taken by opponents of the 1970 amendments to the 1956
Act reflected the significance of the above-mentioned market forces.
120. M. JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 81, at 11. Some felt the legislation was a victory for
group banks.
But most bankers were not so optimistic. Some provisions, such as the prohibition of
interstate banking, were clearly punitive. Others hindered normal credit and invest-
ment operations. Compliance would entail much . . . expense. And the wide
discretionary power vested in the Federal Reserve Board would raise a great deal of
dispute and many problems for all parties involved.
Id.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (current version at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841 (1982)).
123. Id. §§ 7, 9, 80 Stat. at 237, 240.
124. See Note, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1200, 1201, 1208-15 (1970-71).
125. HousE CoNIM. ON BANKING, FIN., AND URBAN AFFAIRs, 98TH CoNG., 1ST SESs., FoPATION AND
POWERS OF NATIONAL BANING A SsOCIATIONS-A LEGAL PRIMER 5-17 (Comm. Print 1983) (prepared
by R. Natter of the American Law Division).
126. Note, supra note 124, at 1209.
127. Id.
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Opponents of the amendments contended that the responsive and procom-
petitive nature of the one-bank BHC had enabled the banking industry to
survive the challenges of the 1960s. Proponents, however, had argued that
unregulated one-bank BHCs threatened to destroy the wall traditionally
perceived as separating commerce and banking.'28
Congress passed the 1970 amendments primarily to bring one-bank
holding companies under the Board's control. 129 In addition, the 1970
amendments made several other important changes including (1) the
expansion of the definition of "control" of a company to include more
indirect forms of control; (2) the modification of the definition of "bank" to
include any institution that is organized under the laws of the United States
or any state, that accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to
withdraw on demand, and that engages in the business of making commer-
cial loans;' 30 (3) the change in wording of the directives pertaining to
permissible nonbanking activities; and (4) the introduction of a public
welfare balancing standard for assessing the value of the related nonbank-
ing activities.
The amendments' expanded test for control gave the Federal Reserve
Board authority to determine that a company was a bank holding company
even when the applicant had control of less than twenty-five percent of an
affiliate's stock.' 3 1 The impetus for this change stemmed from Congress's
recognition that the complexities inherent in contemporary business prac-
tices allowed a company with widely diffused stock ownership to be
controlled by an individual possessing only a minority percentage of
shares.'3 2 Under the 1970 standard, an applicant is considered to be a bank
holding company if it directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence
over the management or policies of the affiliate.' 33 This change gave the
Board the flexibility to prevent potential abuse of the bank holding
company device.
128. Edwards, The One Bank Holding Company Conglomerate: An Analysis and Evaluation, 22
VAND. L. REv. 1275, 1292 (1969) ("[T]he likelihood of achieving economies is much greater
when banks are joined with other financial institutions, since the economic interrelationships
among the products of banks and financial institutions are much greater.").
129. Because "company" remained the operating word in the statute, not all loopholes were
closed. Although the 1956 provision exempting partnerships from the definition of "com-
pany" was eliminated, Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607,
§ 101 (b)(3), 84 Stat. 1762 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1982)), individual ownership was
not addressed. This proved to be particularly significant in chain-banking situations when one
person controls a string of banks. The need to close this loophole was a principal motivator for
Congress to pass the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 602, 29 Stat.
3683 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982)).
130. This definition effectively exempts foreign banks that do business with the United
States only as an incident to their foreign activities. More importantly, under the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, institutions chartered by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board or insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation are also
explicitly excluded. Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 333, 40,1(d)(1), 96 Stat. 1504, 1511 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 24, 1841(c), (1982)).
131. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(a), 84
Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1982)).
132. See id.
133. Id. The Act provides that companies controlling five percent or less of the stock of an
affiliate be considered outside this test. Id.
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Congress made several important alterations affecting the scope of
permissible nonbanking activities in section 4. This section expanded the
Federal Reserve Board's authority to make decisions concerning the
appropriateness of nonbank acquisitions by BHCs. It deleted the 1956
exemption for companies of a "financial, fiduciary or insurance nature."'
134
The 1970 amendments directed the Board to authorize activities that are
"so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to he a
proper incident thereto."'1 5 The amendments also deleted from the
original clause the words "business of banking" in favor of simply
"banking." 36
The House and Senate disputed the expansion of the BHCA's
applicability and the indirect expansion of the Board's powers. The dispute
was apparent from their inability to agree upon original versions of the bill.
The final language of section 4(c)(8) was the product of the conference
committee's consideration of two drafts: the first was that of the House
Conferees, the second was that of Chairman Burns. 37
House members were concerned with the inclusion of "a negative
laundry list" that enumerated specific activities in which one-bank holding
companies and their subsidiaries were not to engage. 138 This reflected the
general sentiment in the House that BHCs should be restricted to the more
narrow standards of the 1956 Act. In conference, a majority of House
members finally abandoned the "laundry list" in exchange for an agree-
ment from the Senate to include the "closely related standard."'13 9
134. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1841-50 (1982)).
135. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103(4), 84
Stat. 1763 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982)).
136. This change was requested by then-Chairman of the Board Arthur Bums, who wrote:
"We have in mind indicating that a non-bank subsidiary's activities should be related to
banking (or managing or controlling banks) generally, rather than to the specific business
carried on by the subsidiary banks of the particular holding company involved." Letter from
Arthur Bums to Rep. Wright Patman (Nov. 25, 1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 41,959
(1970).
137. For an in-depth discussion, see Note, supra note 124, at 1209, 1220.
138. 115 CONG. REc. 33,133-34 (1969). The "laundry list" prohibited one-bank BHCs from
maintaining travel agencies, providing data processing, providing auditing or other profes-
sional accounting services, selling mutual funds, and operating insurance agencies.
139. The Senate, along with the Federal Reserve Board, had sought to adopt a standard that
called for an activity to be "functionally related" as a means of creating maximum flexibility.
The Senate bill originally included this language. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1970).
One commentator reviewing the proceedings concluded that in the overall context of the
situation "the decision to retain the 'closely related' language of the 1956 Act marks a
compromise between the stringent bill passed by the House and the Senate's more liberal
counterpart, and would seem to require the same interpretation recorded in the 1956 Act." M.
JESSEE & S. SEELIG, supra note 81, at 30; see also G. FISCHER, supra note 66, at 151.
The Federal Reserve Board, however, has indicated that it intends to give this section a
broader interpretation, one that would in essence construe the provision as though the
"functionally related" language had been adopted. M. JESSEE & S. SEEUG, supra note 81, at 30.
Shortly after the new legislation was signed into law, the Board proposed to amend Regulation
Y. See 21 Fed. Reg. 10,473 (1956) (proposed Dec. 29, 1956). The amendment contained the
Board's interpretation and policies toward holding companies, setting forth the nonbanking
activities that it regarded as falling within the scope of the new section 4(c)(8). Id.
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Congress delegated additional regulatory duties to the Federal Re-
serve Board by modifying certain procedural requirements. Section 4
includes the language "by order or regulation. 140 Thus, the Board can
determine which activities are closely related to banking by either rule or
order. 141 The new language also provides for due notice and opportunity
for hearings. 42 The oral hearings are not, however, required on all
applications. Precisely when the Board may dispense with oral hearings and
when it must grant them has proven to be ambiguous and has generated
litigation and controversy. 143
The other major change in the 1956 Act was the introduction of a
public benefits test. In deciding whether a nonbanking activity is closely
related to banking, the Board is required to consider whether the activity's
performance by a nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company:
can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such
as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in effi-
ciency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue
concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interests, or unsound banking practices.'"
The Act did not include more concrete guidelines as to how the Board
should apply this standard. At the time of enactment, members of Congress
disputed how this new test would affect the resolution of applications by the
Reserve Board. A minority believed that the imposition of this test made the
standard more difficult than the 1956 law because it provided a second
obstacle to approval. 145 The majority, however, believed that the public
benefits test would free the Board of the restrictive precedents established
under the present Act.146 From a procedural point of view, the addition of
this test ensured at least the possibility of a hearing. The Board could by
rule or order determine what activities were closely related to banking. But
each individual applicant nonetheless had to be prepared to show that
engaging in an approved activity would also meet the public benefits test on
a case-by-case basis.
The Fed's restrictions on acquiring nonbank interests were, for a time,
circumvented by the so-called nonbank bank loophole. Many BHCs sought
to acquire thrift institutions and other banking entities that fell outside the
language of the statute. The Board reacted aggressively and interpreted the
BHCA in a manner that extended its regulatory authority to cover such
entities. In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court struck
down the Fed's interpretation, appropriately leaving it to Congress, rather
140. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1982).
141. This provision is the basis for the Board's issuance of Regulation Y.
142. "[S]hares of any company the activities of which the Board after due notice and
opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation) to be so closely related to
banking .. " 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1982).
143. These procedural issues are dealt with in detail in Part III, infra.
144. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
145. 116 Co.NG. REc. 41,950 (1970). See Note, supra note 124, at 1222 (adding "public
benefits" test that requires Federal Reserve Board use two separate tests in deciding cases
under section 4(c)(8)).
146. 116 CoNG. REc. 31,954 (1970).
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than the Fed, to close this loophole. 147 In 1987 Congress responded by
passing the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 that, among other
things, closed the nonbank bank loophole. 148
C. The Fed and Adjudication
Under sections 3 or 4 of the BHCA, bank holding companies may
request permission to expand their banking interests or to acquire non-
banking interests through applications to the Fed. These applications can
have a variety of substantive effects. From the point of view of the agency,
they may raise new issues that have important policy implications. The Fed
must consider whether its decision to grant or deny these applications
advances the primary purposes of the BHCA-preventing the anticompet-
itive effects of BHCs and limiting the concentration of power that BHCs
represent. From the point of view of the regulated, expansion or acquisition
often can make a significant difference between levels of financial success
or between success and failure. As a legal organizational form, the BHC has
long provided an opportunity for institutions to avoid various state and
federal restrictions on geographic diversification and can also serve as a
vehicle for product expansion.149 Indeed the flexibility of the BHC concept
has done much to change both the structure and regulation of banking.'50
The granting or denying of these applications can have important and
often adverse effects on third parties as well, particularly the competitors of
applicants. There is often a strong incentive for competitors to be sure that
the Board's decision is correct. They often can shed light on the merits of
a pending application by participating in the proceeding, but they also may
have a significant interest in delaying the decision, especially if it is likely to
be adverse to their interests.
147. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
366-75 (1986); see also Malloy, Nonbanks and Nondefinitions: New Challenges In Bank Regulatory
Policy, 10 SEroN HALL LEsIS. J. 1, 23-40 (1986).
148. This Act closed the "nonbank bank" loophole by redefining the term "bank" in the
Bank Holding Company Act as an institution that either is insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or both "(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the
depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others; and
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans." Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101
Stat. 522, 554 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (Supp. V 1987)).
The Conference Report states that a demand deposit includes any deposit account from
which funds are transferred automatically and deposits withdrawable by check or similar
means for payment to third parties including NOW accounts as well as accounts providing for
electronic transfers to third parties. Commercial loans include broker call loans, the purchase
of retail installment paper, loans to securities dealers, and overdrafts in the account of a
business customer. The Act required immediate divestiture for companies that become bank
holding companies as a result of the Act and that acquired, between March 5, 1987, and the
enactment of the Act, a nonbank bank that is defined under the Act as a "bank." See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 261, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 122-26, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS
588, 591-94.
149. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the McFadden Act in such a way as
to encourage geographic expansion on the part of national banks and to increase competition
in the securities industry. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assoc., 479 U.S. 388, 407-08 (1987).
150. See G. FiscHEr, supra note 66, at 165.
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The competitive forces that encourage BHCs to submit applications,
the agency's regulatory goals, and the interests of competitors all shape the
Fed's procedural and substantive responses. These regulatory responses, in
turn, affect and are affected by the time and resources it takes to process
applications. BHC applications have continued to flow to the Fed in record
numbers in the 1980s. Their numbers suggest both the importance and
extent of the changes occurring in the banking industry. 151 They also
indicate why it is important that the Fed rule on these applications in an
expeditious manner.
Section 3 of the Act was passed to deal with BHC expansion. Section
3 requires prior approval from the Board before BHCs may be formed or
additional banks acquired. No application can be approved if it violates the
antitrust standards of either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.152 In
addition, the Board must consider the safety and soundness of these
transactions,15 3 In the nonbanking area, holdiig company expansion is
subject to even more strict requirements and, as we shall see, more specific,
statutorily mandated procedures as well.
The following Part deals first with the procedural hearing require-
ments of section 3, namely those that are necessary before the Board can
grant or deny applications for the formation of new BHCs or applications
for the acquisition of a bank by a BHC. It then examines the hearing
151. Professor Fischer recently wrote:
In just six years, the number of BHCs had very nearly tripled, but this was merely
one element of a vast change in the American banking structure begun in the early
1980s. Broader branch banking, nonbank banks, and interstate banking were to
change the BHCs movement's thrust from intrastate to interstate and ultimately to
nationwide banking. This was to be one of the most challenging periods faced by the
Federal Reserve Board in administering the BHCA, and, as this is written in 1986, it
is far from over.
G. FISCHER, supra note 66, at 238-39. Similarly, a report prepared by the Federal Reserve
Board's own staff notes:
The Federal Reserve's domestic supervisory and regulatory activities should be
considered in the context of two significant trends within the holding company
movement. First, .. . the number of bank holding companies and the percentage of
commercial bank assets controlled by such companies have increased significantly
since the passage of the 1970 Amendments. By bringing companies that owned just
one bank under the statutory definition of bank holding companies, these Amend-
ments increased the number of such companies supervised by the Federal Reserve
from 121 in 1970 to 1,567 in 1971. In 1975, there were 1,821 bank holding coripanies
controlling 69 percent of all commercial bank assets. By 1985, the number of
companies had increased to 6,453 and such companies controlled over 90 percent of
all commercial bank assets.... [WV]hile the overwhelming majority of bank holding
companies have consolidated assets of less than $150 million, over 80 percent of
aggregate holding company assets are held by large regional and multinational
companies with consolidated assets in excess of $I billion.
Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies-Part I: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer & Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 391, 406-07 (1986) (The Federal Reserve Board's Oversight of the Domestic and
International Activities of U.S. Banks and Bank Holding Companies, in the Appendix 2B to the
Statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at B-1 to
-2) (hereinafter BHC Hearings).
152. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982).
153. Id.
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procedures for section 4 applications that involve the control or the
acquisition of ownership interest in nonbanks by BHCs.
1. Section 3 Procedures-The Expansion of Banking Interests
Prior approval by the Board is required before: (1) any company
becomes a BHG; (2) any bank becomes the subsidiary of a BH; (3) any
BHC acquires ownership or control of more than five percent of any class
of voting shares of any bank holding company; (4) any BHC or subsidiary
(except a bank) acquires the assets of a bank; or (5) any BHC merges or
consolidates With any other bank holding company. 54 In acting on section
3 applications, the Board must apply statutory factors which include an
evaluation of the competitive impact of the transaction, the convenience
and needs of the community to be served, and the financial and managerial
resources and future prospects of the BHC and the banks concerned. 55
Section 3 of the BHCA sets forth the procedures governing these
applications.' 56 The Board's own regulations are set forth in Regulation
y.157
Pursuant to the Board's regulations, applications for BHC formation
or expansion are filed initially with the Federal Reserve Bank of the district
in which the head office of the bank holding company is located, rather
than directly with the Board.158 Prior to this filing, notice must be published
in a general circulation newspaper. 159 The Reserve Bank then investigates
and prepares a report on the relevant facts; the report is submitted to the
Board along with the Reserve Bank's recommendations on the
application. 160 Reserve Banks usually cooperate with applicants in an
informal way and help to "clean up" applications before they are sent on to
the Board with their recommendation. After the Board receives the
Reserve Bank's report and recommendations, the Board's staff prepares
comments for the Board. 16' The Board may then take "such action as it
deems appropriate in the public interest.' 6 2 As a recent Board report
makes clear, there is a good deal of give and take in this process:
The scrutiny involved in the applications process provides an
important discipline on the behavior of banking organizations.
Thus, applicants are often responsive to suggestions from the
Federal Reserve for improvements in their condition or for
changes to their proposals in order to limit adverse effects and
thereby increase the chances for approval. Applicants often take
action to improve their condition even before filing pro-
posals .... [W]hile only a relatively small percentage of proposals
is denied, a significant number are modified after filing. Others are
154. Id. § 1842(c).
155. Id. § 1842(a).
156. Id. § 1842(b).
157. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1988).
158. Id. § 262.3(c).
159. Id. § 262.3(b)(vi).
160. Id. § 262.3(d).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 262.3(f).
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withdrawn, at least until remedial changes can be effected. Through this
process, banking organizations are encouraged to constrain their expan-
sion to appropriate levels, to avoid excessive risk-taking and, if necessary,
to improve their condition.163
This kind of negotiated regulation usually is not susceptible to formal
or even informal adversarial hearings. Negotiated regulation increases
efficiency and provides the agency with an opportunity to tailor its decisions
to the individual applicant. As discussed in Part III, however, problems may
arise, particularly if the agency imposes conditions or makes informal
suggestions that arguably go beyond its authority or represent a policy that
has not been officially established or published. A party eager to close a deal
may not feel it has much negotiating room. In such cases, the Board has
superior, indeed coercive, bargaining power.
The regulations also provide for comments and timely written re-
quests for a hearing. Such requests must include a statement explaining
why a written presentation would not suffice, identifying specifically any
disputed questions of fact, and summarizing the evidence that would be
presented at a hearing.16 4 If adverse comments are received from any
interested party, the applicant receives a copy of the comments and an
opportunity to respond in writing. 165 If there are no adverse comments, the
matter is ready for Board action. 166
In addition to the Board's regulations, section 3 of the Act requires the
Board to give notice to the Comptroller of the Currency if a national bank
is involved or to the relevant state supervisory authority if a state bank is
involved. 167 Their "views and recommendations shall be submitted within
thirty calendar days of the date on which notice is given or within ten
calendar days of such date if... an emergency exists requiring expeditious
action."' 6 8
If a section 3 hearing is statutorily required, that is, if the Board issues
a denial within thirty days, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 16 9
requires a full-blown, trial-type adjudicative hearing pursuant to the
163. BHC Hearings, supra note 151, at 151 (Board Report, at B-6) (emphasis added).
164. 12 C.F.R. § 262.3(e) (1988).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982).
168. Id. The statute then goes on to state:
If the thirty-day notice period applies and if the Comptroller of the Currency or the
State supervisory authority so notified by the Board disapproves the application in
writing within this period, the Board shall forthwith give written notice of that fact to
the applicant. Within three days after giving such notice to the applicant, the Board
shall notify in writing the applicant and the disapproving authority of the date for
commencement of a hearing.... Any such hearing shall be commenced not less than
ten nor more than thirty days after the Board has given written notice to the applicant
of the action of the disapproving authority. The length of any such hearing shall be
determined by the Board, but it shall afford all interested parties a reasonable
opportunity to testify at such hearing. At the conclusion thereof, the Board shall, by
order, grant or deny the application on the basis of that record made at such hearing.
Id.
169. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1982).
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Board's own rules of practice for hearings. 70 These hearings require a
hearing examiner, the admission of parties, testimony under oath, cross-
examination, rules of evidence, and ultimately, a decision on the record. 17'
The Board has the right to waive this hearing for emergencies, such as the
need.for immediate action to prevent a bank failure.' 72 When no section 3
statutory hearing is required, the Board can, at its discretion, grant requests
for a formal hearing submitted by interested parties even if the Comptroller
or a state regulatory authority does not object to the application. 73
As a practical matter, the Board seldom grants such hearings. It may
be that once an applicant believes its application will be denied, it withdraws
the application to make whatever changes are necessary. The lack of
hearings also may be due to the fact that if the Comptroller or state
authority involved wishes to deny the application, she simply may wait for
the thirty-day period to run and then express her disapproval.' 74 This does
not mean that there will be no hearing, but that the Board will grant a
hearing at its discretion.
Section 3 requires the Board to act on applications for approval within
ninety-one days of the submission of the application. 75 Although the
Board's regulations trigger the rule at specific times, 76 there has been
considerable dispute as to when the ninety-one-day period begins to run. 77
170. See 12 C.F.R. § 263 (1988); see also id. at §§ 261.3(a), 263.4 (requiring notice of formal
hearings to be published in the Federal Register).
171. See 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 263 (1988).
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982).
173. See 12 C.F.R. § 262.3 (1988); see, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 567 F.2d 1082, 1085 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reviewing
legislative history of Bank Holding Company Act of 1956).
174. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982) (disapproval of application by Comptroller of the
Currency or state authority within 30-day notice period triggers hearing); see also 12 C.F.R.
§ 262.3(e) (1988) (requests for hearings must be "before the 30th day after the date notice is
first published").
175. Section 3 states:
In the event of the failure of the Board to act on any application for approval under
this section within the ninety-one-day period which begins on the date of submission
to the Board of the complete record on the application, the application shall be
deemed to have been granted.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1982). Section 4 of the BHCA contains a similar provision that applies
to applications submitted by bank holding companies under section 4(c)(8). See id. § 1843(c).
176. For the purpose of computing the ninety-one-day period, the records shall be
regarded as complete on the latest of:
(i) the date of receipt by the Board of an application that has been accepted for
processing by the Reserve Bank;
(ii) the last day provided in any notice for receipt of comments and hearing requests
on the application;
(iii) the date of receipt by the Board of the last relevant material regarding the
application that is needed for the Board's decision, if the material is received from a
source outside of the Federal Reserve System; or
(iv) the date of completion of any hearing or other proceeding [ordered by the
Board].
12 C.F.R. § 225.14(g)(2) (1988). These regulations apply to both section 3 and section 4
applications. See id. § 225.23(h).
177. See Republic of Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F.2d
1026, 1034-43 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing "proper operation of 91-day rule").
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Dates for commencement of the ninety-one-day period have emerged from
court decisions interpreting the rule. 7 8
Because the ninety-one-day period may be affected by processing
events, including the publication of notice that the application has been
submitted, or the Reserve Bank's acceptance of the application for forward-
ing to the Board, the Board's regulations also provide detailed rules
regarding each step of the application process. 179 Despite these rules and
clarifications, a number of questions arise. When circumstances and eco-
nomic conditions change, new information is often required. Can the
Board begin the ninety-one-day period anew by requesting new
information? 8 0 If so, how significant must this request for information be?
Even with these ambiguities, applications that are not withdrawn are
processed relatively efficiently.' 8 ' In part this is because of the strong
178. See Republic of Texas Corp., 649 F.2d at 1037 (noting courts differ in determining what
material is relevant and necessary to begin the ninety-one-day period).
179. For example, the Board's regulations regarding processing of applications received
under section 3 of the BHCA provide that, upon receipt of an application, "the Reserve Bank
shall promptly furnish notice" of the application to the appropriate banking supervisor, and
"notice of the application shall be promptly sent to the Federal Register for publication." 12
C.F.R. § 225.14(b) (1988). The regulation also provides that the Federal Register notice shall
invite public comment for a period of no longer than 30 days. Id.
The regulations also provide that within ten business days of an application's receipt by the
Reserve Bank, the Reserve Bank shall accept the application for processing or notify the
applicant that additional information is necessary to complete the application. Id. § 225.14(c).
If the application is resubmitted with the requested additional information, the Reserve Bank,
under the Board's regulations, must either accept the application for processing or return it
within five business days, if the application continues to be incomplete. Id. Finally, the Board's
regulations provide that upon acceptance of the application, the Reserve Bank immediately
must forward the application to the Board. Id.
180. There are other ambiguities as well. For example, "[tlhe effect of the elapse of the
ninety-one day period on the rights of protestants to an application is undear." P. HELLER,
FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMIPANY LAw § 7.04, at 7-25 (1986). The Act seems to place the burden
on these protestants to show that statutory criteria have not been met. See id; see also
BankAmerica v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 596 F.2d 1368, 1377-79 (9th Cir.
1979) (finding a third party's protest was relevant because the protest "contain(ed) information
relevant to public benefit criteria the Board must apply"). It also is unclear whether an
acquired company is entitled to the requirements of the rule or whether thos2 rights could be
waived by the applicant.
In addition, if the ninety-one-day period expires and approval is thus assumed, how can the
applicant proceed to complete the transaction? This question is particularly relevant if the
Board does not believe the ninety-one-day period has expired. If an applicant asks the Board
for a ruling and the Board finds the ninety-one-day period has not elapsed, is the Board's
order appealable or must the applicant await the Board's final order? Given that acquisition or
merger deals are fluid and often require very prompt action, the expiration of the ninety-
one-day period could have a significant impact. See generally BankAmerica, 596 F.2d at 1374-75.
The applicability of the ninety-one-day rule to acquisitions that Congress prohibits also poses
problems. See, e.g., North Lawndale Economic Dev. Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 553 F.2d 23, 26-27 (7th Cir. 1977) (deem application for engaging in nonbanking
interests granted for Board's failure'to act within the ninety-one-day period).
181. The staff of the Federal Reserve reports:
The Board's Regulation Y and internal operating procedures make timeliness a
principal objective in the applications process. Although the Act provides that the
Board may take up to 91 days after the submission of the complete record,
procedures were voluntarily developed in 1971 that established internal processing
periods substantially shorter than those required by statute. Since that time, the
internal goal of 90 calendar days has been reduced to 60 days and processing
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incentives that exist to negotiate rather than to litigate over these applica-
tions. As we shall see in Part III, the ability to start and stop the running of
the ninety-one-day rule is significant in the bargaining relationship that
develops between the staff and the applicant.
2. Section 4(c)(8) Procedures
In contrast to section 3 cases, section 4(c)(8) cases involve nonbanking
interests. Section (4)(c)(8) authorizes Board approval only of BHC acquisi-
tions of nonbanking entities whose activities are "closely related" to and a
"proper incident" of banking. 82 The acquiring holding company must
apply to the Board for approval under this nonbank provision of the Act,183
The BHCA permits bank holding companies to acquire
shares of any company the activities of which the Board after due
notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or
regulation) to be so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto . . . . In
determining whether a particular activity is a proper incident to
banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall con-
sider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding com-
pany can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the
public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or
gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as
efficiencies have continued. In addition, the Board has developed a "notification"
process for certain bank holding company proposals that normally do not present any
issues. Thus, a bank holding company need only notify the Reserve Bank-rather
than receive prior approval-for the acquisition of a de novo permissible nonbanking
firm, the acquisition of a "small" nonbanking going concern, or the redemption of the
bank holding company's shares. After a waiting period of 15-30 days from accep-
tance, the proposal may be consummated unless objected to by the Reserve Bank.
Several hundred such proposals are processed by the System each year.
As indicated above, the Board has, over time, been concerned that applications be
processed in as timely a manner as possible, and in the early 1970s established an
objective of processing 90 percent of all applications within 90 days. The Board
modified this goal in 1983 to process 90 percent of all applications within 60 days.
These processing objectives have been met every year since 1977. In 1985, the
Federal Reserve processed 96 percent of all applications within the 60 day period.
BHC Hearings, supra note 151, at 411 (Board Report, at B-6).
During 1986, the Board processed a total of 1,681 applications under the BHCA. The
Board processed over 93% of those applications within the 60-day period provided in the
Board's regulations. The remainder of the cases were considered by the Board within the
ninety-one-day rule. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
196, 198 (1986).
182. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(b)(1) (1982).
183. Recently, one court noted that the Federal Reserve System was subjected to "an
avalanche of applications by bank holding companies seeking to establish hundreds of deposit
taking institutions across state lines .. " Florida Dept. of Banking v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., 760 F.2d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 1985). To some extent, this activity was
due to the so-called nonbank bank loophole, a loophole that has now been closed by the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101 Stat. 522, 554(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (Supp. V 1987)). Nevertheless, section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA
continues to be an important vehicle for nonbank acquisitions, particularly those involving
insurance, real estate and securities activities.
74 IOWA LAW REVIEW
undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competi-
tion, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices .... 184
In practice, the Board's "so closely related to banking... as to be a proper
incident thereto" determination is based upon other provisions of the
BHCA,185 as well as regulations that the Board formulated and adopted in
its Regulation Y.186 Consequently, the Board typically evaluates applica-
tions by pre-existing and generalized standards.
The second determination-whether the benefits to the public can
reasonably be expected to outweigh the possible adverse effects-must be
made on an application-by application basis "after due notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing." Not surprisingly, existing competitors and trade
associations often oppose a holding company's proposed entry into "their"
market on public benefit grounds. Although the issues inherent in the
public benefit determination often may be adequately aired in written
submissions to the Board, opponents of a holding company's application
may allege "adverse effects" and demand that the Board permit discovery
and conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the matter. Whatever the merits
of these requests, providing trial-type hearing procedures virtually guar-
antees a protracted and more expensive application process; conversely, by
denying a protestant's request for a hearing, the Board runs the risk of
providing the protestant with a viable issue forjudicial review. The question
of when to grant a protestant's request for a hearing looms as a procedural
obstacle for both the Board and expanding holding companies.18 7
This problem created a split among the federal circuits reviewing the
Board's section 4(c)(8) determinations. All courts recognize that an agency
need not order a hearing unless it determines that there are disputed issues
of material fact whose resolution will bear on the matter at hand.188 Put
another way, courts agree that the Board is not obligated to order a hearing
on an application if a hearing would serve no purpose.189 The circuit courts
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) (emphasis added).
185. See P. HELLER, supra note 181, § 5.01(1)-(22), at 7-24.
186. See Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1988) (issued by Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System under 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982)).
187. Professors Heifer and Morse contend that because of the confusion over when a
hearing is necessary, opponents of holding company acquisitions can challenge applications
and delay resolution for months or even years with expensive and time-consuming adminis-
trative proceedings of questionable value. See Helfer & Morse, Hearings Under Section 4(c)(8) of
the Bank Holding Company Act, 101 BANKING L.J. 50, 64 (1984). Helfer and Morse advocate
streamlining the application process by creating stages of review in which the members
determine if there is a legitimate factual dispute that has bearing on the Board's decision
before resorting to an expensive evidentiary hearing. The Board appears to have informally
adopted this procedure. See generally Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1931) (remanding for evidentiary
hearing); Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F.2d
245 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding of denial of request for hearing on grounds that no material
issue of fact existed).
188. See, e.g., Ohio Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 7,4 F.2d 162, 170
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
189. See Connecticut Bankers Ass'n 627 F.2d at 250-51; Independent Bankers Ass'n of Georgia
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.. 516 F.2d 1206, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 509 F.2d 29,
38-39 (8th Cir. 1974).
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have disagreed, however, as to the type of information that a protestant
must initially proffer to establish a disputed issue of fact.
In Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System,190 the Independent Insurance Agents of America
(IIAA) opposed Mercantile Bancorporation's application to sell credit-
related property and casualty insurance through a nonbank subsidiary. 191
Although these activities were among those approved by the Board and
listed in Regulation Y as being "closely related" to banking, the IIAA
nevertheless challenged the acquisition on public benefit grounds, contend-
ing that in this case the possible adverse effects outweighed the public
benefits. 192 Specifically, the IIAA contended that customers would pur-
chase insurance from the subsidiary to improve their chances of getting a
loan from the bank, that the insurance would be priced above competitive
levels, and that consumers would be deprived of the services of an agent. 19S
The Board requested the protestants (IIAA) file detailed descriptions of
their objections and the issues they wished to explore in a hearing. 194 After
requiring Mercantile to submit additional information in response to the
protestant's charges, and after allowing the protestants to respond to
Mercantile's additional submissions, the Board denied the request for a
hearing and approved the application. 195
The Eighth Circuit vacated the approval, reasoning that "the Board's
refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing . . . prevented the IIAA from
substantiating its claim that [Mercantile's] activities would not result in
overall net benefits to the public."'196 Despite the Board's seemingly careful
review of written submissions and resubmissions, the court rejected the
argument that the IIAA's objections were mere speculation. The court
stated that "[t]he Board cannot deny a request for an evidentiary hearing
when, as here, it is presented with legitimate contentions which place
material facts in dispute."' 97 Upon remand, the Board conducted a full
evidentiary hearing before again approving Mercantile's application- over
two and one-half years after the Board had initially approved the
proposal. 198
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has adopted a more restrictive view of a protestant's right to an
evidentiary hearing. In Connecticut Bankers Association v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 199 the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the
Board's decision to deny Connecticut Bankers Association's request for a
hearing, stating that "a protestant does not become entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing merely on request, or on a bald or conclusory allegation that
such a dispute exists. The protestant must make a minimal showing that
190. 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1981).
191. Id. at 573.
192. Id. at 575.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 573.
196. Id. at 576.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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material facts are in dispute, thereby demonstrating that an 'inquiry in
depth' is appropriate. '200 The protestants had opposed Citicorp's applica-
tion to establish a nonbank subsidiary through which it planned to sell
credit-related insurance and second-mortgage loans.201 Although these
activities were approved by the Board's Regulation Y, the Association
alleged that the adverse effects of the operation-undue concentration of
economic resources, diminution of competition, and unfair competition
against Connecticut banks-would outweigh the public benefits. 202
In Connecticut Bankers, the Board had required the applicant, Citicorp,
to provide specific and detailed answers to the protestant's questions,
allowed the protestant to make an informal oral presentation to the Board's
staff to develop and clarify issues of fact, and reviewed written arguments
in support of the hearing request before denying the request "because
there [were] no facts in dispute that bear upon the determination the Board
must make."203 Although the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the
case to the Board for further reconsideration of certain issues, it did not
order the Board to conduct a hearing. The court observed that the
protestant's evidence of Citicorp's great size and proliferation of lending
subsidiaries alone did not raise issues of material fact, nor had the
protestant offered any reason why the Board could not rely on Citicorp's
representation that it would not operate the subsidiary as a branch. 204
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit was not of
the view that "legitimate contentions ... place material facts in dispute."205
Instead, it required evidence-"as contrasted with mere possibility or
speculation" 206-to dispute a fact the applicant asserted or denied. The
District of Columbia Circuit also indicated that even when a protestant has
raised an issue of fact, the Board need not grant a hearing if the issue is not
material to the Board's determination. Moreover, the Board's conditioning
its approval on the applicant's acceptance of Board-imposed operating
restrictions may also preclude the necessity of a hearing.207 Upon remand,
the Board required Citicorp to file a written submission on how it planned
to minimize the danger of unfair competition. 203 Again concluding that
there was no issue of material fact in dispute, the Board approved Citicorp's
application without a hearing.209
200. Id. at 251.
201. Id. at 247.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 248.
204. Id. at 253.
205. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
658 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
206. Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 627 F.2d
245, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
207. Id. at 258.
208. Citicorp, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 443, 444 (1981).
209. Id. at 446. Both the Tenth and the Fourth Circuits appear to subscribe to the District
of Columbia Circuit's more restrictive view of a protestant's right to a hearing under the
nonbank exception to the BHCA. See Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bd., 766
F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985); Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Board of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys., 646 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1981). Although considering a different portion
of the BHCA, the Eighth Circuit recently relied heavily on the District of Columbia Circuit's
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The way in which the court and the Board handled the hearing
requirement clearly affected the pace of holding companies' nonbank
expansion.210 The Board allows hearings only if a material issue of fact is in
dispute and an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve it. This has
resulted in infrequent adjudicatory hearings. We now turn to the informal
bargaining phase.
III. BARGAINING FOR JUSTICE-REGULATORY CONDITIONS
AND VOLUNTARY COMMITMENTS
Part III examines the Fed's informal decisionmaking, particularly its
use of conditions and voluntary commitments. It first presents the three
distinct regularory phases Congress established in the BHCA's applications
process. These phases are (1) the informational phase; (2) the bargaining
phase; and (3) the adjudicatory or adversarial phase. Each phase is subject
to its own model of dispute resolution. Part III then examines in detail the
bargaining phase of the process, particularly the Fed's use of conditions and
voluntary commitments. It also examines the assumptions that underlie this
bargaining model, points out why that model is not fully applicable in an
agency setting such as this, and makes recommendations to help ensure
additional fairness without undercutting agency flexibility.
A. Three Models-An Overview
The Board's action at the preliminary stage of an application usually
prevents the need for a formal or informal hearing. The Board routinely
may approve an uncontroversial application. If an application is controver-
sial, however, the Board may indicate to the applicant that problems exist
with the initial submission. An applicant may withdraw the application at
this preliminary stage, particularly if it appears that it is going to be denied.
An applicant may revise and amend the application to respond to the staff's
concerns. This phase of the administrative process is based less on a
judgmental model and more on an informational model and, ultimately, on
a bargaining or negotiation model of the administrative process.
An applicant may not have supplied the data and information neces-
sary for the Board to act. The application is thus deniable because it is
incomplete. At this preliminary stage of the proceeding, the agency staff
simply is requesting information that the Board needs to consider the
view in ruling that a protestant was not entitled to a hearing. See Haston v. Board of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 758 F.2d 275, 284 (8th Cir. 1985).
210. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
745 F.2d 677, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying protestant's petition for appellate review but only
after more than three years of administrative proceedings). Professors Heifer and Morse
describe this case's administrative proceedings, that included
the exchange of more than a dozen letters, a prehearing conference, the presentation
of nearly 1,700 pages of oral and written testimony, examination and cross-
examination of 11 witnesses, seven days of hearings over four months, introduction
of over 350 exhibits, a recommended decision of the administrative law judge, and
formal Board approval of the application.
Helfer and Morse, supra note 188, at 57 n.25.
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merits of the applicant's proposal and to reach the next, more judgmental
part of the process. In its purest form, this phase of the process involves no
disputes over facts or law. Of course, conflicts can arise during the
informational phase. Disputes over the relevancy of the information sought
and provided can reflect the applicant's and staff s differing theories of the
case. At this point, the ninety-one-day rule comes into play. New requests
for information toll the ninety-one-day period and thus extend the time
period in which the agency must make its decision. Controversial cases
-cases in which the theory of the case held by staff differs significantly
from that of the applicant-can take more than ninety-one days to be
resolved. Theoretically, the informational phase of the process should be
distinct from the judgmental phases. In most instances, this is the case. It is
possible, however, for an application to founder at this stage because of a
disagreement over the relevancy or availability of requested information.
Once an application is informationally complete, the agency begins to
consider its merits. The merits include not only what the applicant seeks to
accomplish, but who the applicant is. The staff must consider not only the
competitive effects of a proposed acquisition and the degree to which the
nonbank that the applicant wishes to acquire is related to banking, but also
the financial status of the applicant: can it successfully do what it seeks
permission to accomplish? In addition, the Board must consider the
longterm policy implications of granting or denying the application. At
least three decisionmaking factors interact when the Board reaches the
merits of an application: (1) the legal requirements of the Act; (2) the
factual context of a particular application; and (3) the policy implications of
allowing the applicant to pursue the course of action it proposes.
Once it reacts to the merits of the case, the Board adheres to a
bargaining or negotiation model of agency decisionmaking. From a purely
theoretical viewpoint, this model of dispute settlement differs from the
adversarial model inherent in the adjudicatory hearings examined in Part
II. Though perhaps oversimplified, especially as applied to the administra-
tive process, Professor Gulliver's description helpfully captures some of the
key differences between these two, pure models:
[t]he picture of negotiation is one of two sets of people, the
disputing parties or their representatives, facing each other across
a table or from opposite sides of an open space. They exchange
information and opinion, engage in argument and discussion,
and sooner or later propose offers and counter offers relating to
the issues in dispute between them, seeking an outcome accept-
able to both sides. The comparable picture of adjudication is that
of two [or more] parties ... who, separated from one another, face
an adjudicator who sits in front of, apart from, and often raised
above them. They address him, offering information, opinion,
and arguments. Each seeks to refute the other's presentation and
to persuade the adjudicator to favor his own case. Eventually the
adjudicator pronounces his decision on the issues, often sorting
out and summing up the information given to him and explaining
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his judgment.2 11
Clearly, the crucial difference between the two models is the absence of the
third-party decision maker who is present not only at the formal adjudica-
dons carried on at the Fed on rare occasions, but also at the more informal
Board hearings. Given that final Board orders are subject to judicial review,
that neutral third party theoretically may enter the process at a later point
in the proceedings.
In reality, however, most Board proceedings, particularly at the early
stages of the application process, more accurately fit within the negotiation
or bargaining model. A decision made during the early stages of the process
appears to be, and often is, ajoint decision. The applicant, of course, wishes
to have its application granted. The staff may wish to do so, but may be
troubled by certain aspects of the proposal. They may suggest changes or
condition approval upon commitments the applicant is willing to make.
Each party can obtain only what in the end the other is prepared to allow.
If staff and petitioner have a different view of the legal significance of the
facts presented in a particular application, informal discussions and bar-
gaining may enable one side to move closer to the other's point of view.
Regulatory conditions and voluntary commitments often play a significant
role in this phase of the process. Particularly from the applicants' point of
view, conditions and voluntary commitments are the very currency of the
negotiating process.
From the agency's viewpoint, a condition is a well-established regula-
tory device that enables it to tailor its decision to the peculiarities of the
applicant, further a policy goal it wishes to achieve, or both. It allows the
agency to grant the benefit that the applicant seeks, and to obtain some
assurances in exchange. Conditions can be fact specific and peculiar to the
individual applicant or represent a general policy that may or may not be
implicated by the facts of the case. Because conditions usually appear in
final agency orders, they are presumably supported by the administrative
record, and their legality can be tested at the adversarial stage of the
agency's proceedings and through judicial review.
Not all conditions necessarily require support by the record, nor are
they always susceptible to judicial review. This is particularly true when
conditions take the form of voluntary commitments. Such commitments
often are not a part of the Fed's final order, nor are they eligible for judicial
review. Voluntary commitments usually are found in letters of transmittal
between the Fed and the applicant, and confidentiality may require that
they not be included in the final order. If they are truly voluntary, they also
may represent so fact-specific an agreement between the Board and the
applicant that they have little general relevance and no real precedential
effect. Such commitments often are the result of the bargaining phase of
the regulatory process and represent requirements that were voluntarily
accepted by the applicant to meet the Fed's applicant-specific regulatory
concerns. In some cases, The Fed does not seek the commitments that are
volunteered by applicants who hope to expedite the decisionmaking
process and eliminate doubt concerning the appropriateness of their
211. P. GULLIVER, DisPTms AND NEGOTIAMOnS 3 (1979).
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proposal. As we shall see below, however, "voluntariness" is a complicated
concept. In some contexts, a commitment may result from an applicant's
sense that its application would be denied unless it "voluntarily" agreed to
a condition that it thought was unwise, unnecessary, or even ultra vires.
Not all issues arising under sections 3 and 4 are resolved informally.
The Fed occasionally uses full-blown formal hearings, as well as more
informal adjudicatory hearings before the Board. These formal or informal
hearings are based on an adversarial model of administrative law. They
assume that there are disputes over facts, law, or policy, and that there is a
need for a neutral third party to resolve them. Such decisions are subject to
judicial review.
It is impossible to segregate the three phases of the administrative
process. The informational, bargaining, and adjudicatory phases of dispute
settlement, particularly as applied to the application process, overlap and
intersect in many ways. We have already discussed how the informational
needs of the agency can implicate the judgmental aspects of the bargaining
process. 212 Similarly, the Fed's bargaining stage has adjudicatory overtones,
particularly when what is in contention is not the significance of the facts,
but the significance of broad questions of law and policy. Because the
administrative staff inherently has greater bargaining power than the
applicant, the staff takes on the qualities of an adjudicator as well as a
negotiator. By resolving the legal questions themselves, the staff effectively
can decide the case, particularly if time and circumstances preclude resort
to the more adversarial phase of the process.
This is often the case. Most merger or acquisition opportunities
require very prompt action, putting pressure on both the Board and the
applicants to settle contentious matters quickly. Conditions and commit-
ments expedite agreement, making appeals to the Board to resolve issues of
fact, law, or policy unlikely. Applicants rarely resort to the courts or to the
formal adjudicatory hearings provided under sections 3 and 4 because the
deal struck in the negotiation will seldom survive litigation.
Board members tend to treat voluntary commitments as waivers of an
applicant's arguments on the legal and policy issues inherent in their
applications. Thus, they have a way of becoming a fait accompli, making
Board involvement in the policy implications of voluntary commitments
unlikely and judicial review impossible. There is no need to build a record
for purposes of judicial review if the commitment is a voluntary one; the
applicant cannot agree to a commitment and then renege on the deal by
going to court. Negotiated commitments, therefore, in effect often are as
final as formally adjudicated orders.
Theoretically, the bargaining stage of the process should be different
than the adjudicatory or adversarial phase. No third party determines the
outcome of the bargaining phase. The only outcome is the one to which
both disputants agree, even though their reasons for acceptance are likely
to be very different. The Fed's legal monopoly on the regulatory benefits
that applicants seek in section 3 and section 4 cases, however, can
significantly diminish the relative bargaining strength of the applicant and,
212. See supra text accompanying notes 176-82.
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in certain regulatory contexts, improperly convert the bargaining phase of
the regulatory process into an adjudicatory one.
Of course, the nature of regulation properly militates against equality
of bargaining positions between the regulated and the regulator. No one
expects them to be equal. For example, Congress gave the Fed power to
coerce the kind of behavior that the law requires from banks and bank
holding companies. Nevertheless, our focus is on the bargaining process
and the use of this process as a regulatory tool. It is important to
understand both the advantages and the limitations of the informal
bargaining process if the regulation is to occur within that context. An
applicant's ability and opportunity to bargain are extremely important to
the success of the application processes Congress established in the BHCA.
Of vital importance is the decisionmaking flexibility that this process
provides. In most cases, flexibility is preferable to the all-or-nothing
consequences of either granting the application as requested, or denying it
outright. The nature of an individually oriented application process allows
an agency to tailor its regulatory powers to the case at hand.
Definite risks, however, attach to this kind of negotiated regulation.
Not all negotiated outcomes are proper, particularly when the bargaining
involves disputed issues of law and unarticulated or unclear Board policies.
While most cases may be handled in a routine fashion, and are susceptible
to negotiated decisions, difficult cases can raise serious questions concern-
ing the substance of commitments and the extent to which they are
voluntarily accepted. The process by which these commitments are made
arguably should be more, rather than less formal. Certain kinds of
regulatory outcomes are best achieved through the use of adjudicatory and
rulemaking proceedings, rather than informal bargaining processes.
The remainder of this Article examines the contexts in which bargain-
ing occurs and the kinds of conditions that can result. To provide a broad
legal framework for our analysis of the appropriate limits of an agency's
conditioning power, the next section sets forth the United States Supreme
Court's recent approach to reviewing conditions imposed by Congress
when exercising its spending power. With this as background, we then
examine the use of conditions and commitments at the agency level in
general, and at the Fed in particular.
B. Unconstitutional Conditions and the Spending Power
Conditions have always been an important Congressional regulatory
tool and a source of considerable governmental power. This form of
regulatory power has grown as the power of the government has grown.
The more benefits or largess government provides, the more opportunities
there are for the government to condition the grant of these benefits on the
extension of various policies and goals. A large legal literature has devel-
oped dealing with the constitutional limits on Congress in its use of
conditions.213 A full review of these cases and literature is outside the scope
213. For a thorough rendition of this literature and the key cases that have arisen, see
generally Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1293.
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of this Article, but it is a useful starting point to examine the constitutional
limits on the use of conditions the United States Supreme Court set forth in
a recent case dealing with the congressional spending power.
In South Dakota v. Dole,214 South Dakota challenged the constitution-
ality of a federal statute that conditioned the states' receipt of five percent
of federal highway funds on the adoption of a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one. 215 South Dakota, which permitted nineteen year-olds to pur-
chase beer containing 3.2 percent alcohol, contended that Congress's
decision to condition highway funds in this way violated Congress's
spending power and the twenty-first amendment.21 6 The twenty-first
amendment gives the states virtually complete control over whether to
permit the importation or sale of liquor and how to structure liquor
distribution systems. South Dakota argued that conditioning federal high-
way funds on action that clearly is reserved to the discretion of the states is
unconstitutional.21 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed. Writing for the majority, he held
that Congress had acted constitutionally by indirectly encouraging unifor-
mity in the states' drinking ages.218 This was so even if one were to assume
that Congress could not, under the twenty-first amendment, directly
regulate drinking ages.2 19 This opinion provided Congress with very broad,
but not unlimited, conditioning powers. Justice O'Connor, in dissent,
succinctly set forth those limits: "[1] the expenditures must be for the
general welfare . . . [2] the conditions imposed must be for the general
welfare ... [3] the conditions imposed must be unambiguous... [4] they
must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure."2 20 InJustice
O'Connor's view, the fourth condition was not satisfied in this case:
"establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related
to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appro-
priated for that purpose. '22'
The majority applied these factors more expansively. In evaluating the
relationship between the condition and the general welfare, the Court
concluded that "the condition imposed by Congress is directly related to
one of the main purposes for which highway funds are expended-safe
interstate travel." 222 The Court also took an expansive view of the volun-
tariness of the program. The Chief Justice emphasized that South Dakota
was under no compulsion to change its drinking law;223 it simply could
refuse the federal funds224 and retain a minimum drinking age of
nineteen. 22 5 The majority quoted Steward Machine Co. v. Davis2 26 to distin-
214. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
215. Id. at 205.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 205-06.
218. Id. at 206.
219. Id. at 212-13.
220. Id. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 208.
223. Id. at 210.
224. Id. at 211.
225. Id.
226. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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guish coercion from temptation:
"[E]very rebate from a tax when conditioned upon conduct is in
some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or tempta-
tion is equivalent to coercion is to involve the law in endless
difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a
philosophical determination by which choice becomes impossible.
Till now the law has been guided by robust common sense which
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the
solution of its problems. '227
As we shall see below, the use of conditions at the agency level raises
a number of issues and problems. Nevertheless, some general agency
guidelines can be extracted from this constitutional approach. First, an
agency extends conditions and agrees to commitments in accordance with
its enabling act. Just as congressional conditions are judged first in relation
to the Constitutional power that authorized them, regulatory conditions
and commitments are judged in terms of the agency's statutory (or
"regulatory constitutional") power. An ultra vires condition imposed by an
agency is the regulatory counterpart to an unconstitutional condition
imposed by Congress.
Second, the requirement that conditions be unambiguous and easily
followed fully applies at the agency level where conditions are more easily
administrated and enforced. Perhaps less obvious in the requirement of
clarity at the congressional level is the implicit requirement that agency
conditions be public. They should be accessible, and thus, a known and
knowable source of law. This, however, is not always the case. Many
voluntary commitments at the Fed, for example, are not found in the
published orders of the Board. Moreover, the Fed's conditions create a
body of law that may be so fact-specific that the underlying policy is
unclear. While the statute at issue in South Dakota v. Dole clearly indicates
that Congress's policy was to raise the drinking age and reduce alcohol-
related traffic accidents, clear policy indications often are lost in the high-
volume and fact-specific nature of agency conditions. It is advisable for the
Fed to examine periodically the conditions in its orders, summarize their
policy, and then make this summary available to the public. If a new policy
has emerged, an agency rulemaking proceeding might be in order.
Third, the Court's analysis in South Dakota v. Dole suggests that agency
conditions should be within the agency's statutory power, and reasonably
related to the agency's regulatory goals. Requirements for agency condi-
tions, however, can be even more specific. Because an agency considers
individual applications, its conditioning power should be limited to the
issues raised in the application or petition before it. In other words, the
conditions and commitments should be in response to needs arising from
the facts of the case before the Board. What is, and what is not a relevant
condition should be construed more narrowly at the agency level than at
the congressional level. This is because agencies have other processes
available to resolve legal and policy issues that go beyond the individual
227. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 589-90).
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applicant. Conditions that seek to further a controversial interpretation of
a question of law or policy are best resolved at a more adversarial stage of
the administrative process.
Finally, it is appropriate to take a less expansive view of what is and
what is not voluntary when dealing with agency commitments. This is
because, unlike the State of South Dakota in the Dole case, individual
applicants dealing with a federal agency have even less bargaining power
than a state's representatives in Congress. The Fed's monopoly on the
regulatory benefits that it can provide pursuant to the BHCA seriously
undermines the use of bargaining to resolve legal or policy regulatory
issues.
C. Conditions and Commitments at the Agency
Level-The Federal Reserve Board
Before examining the use of conditions and commitments at the Fed,
it is important to review the conditioning power of the Fed and the kinds of
cases in which conditions are important. This section then examines five
specific kinds of conditions or commitments that can be used at the Fed or
at any administrative agency.
1. Conditions-General Fed Powers
The Bank Holding Company Act clearly authorizes the use of condi-
tions. As Pauline Heller has noted in her treatise: "Authority to approve or
to deny reasonably implies authority to impose conditions." 22S Specific and
implied statutory authority for the Board's use of conditions is found
throughout the Act.2 29 Pursuant to this authority, the Fed has long used
conditional orders to accomplish a variety of tasks in a variety of ways.
Conditions may result from the application of general regulations, 230 the
provisions of an individual order, or the extraction of a "voluntary"
commitment from an applicant.
The Board may impose conditions on application approvals in a
variety of contexts. Such conditions include: shortening the life of a
grandfather exemption; 231 limiting activities in which BHCs may
engage; 23 2 requiring compliance with the Community Reinvestment
228. P. HELLER, supra note 181, § 7.08, at 59 & n.10.
229. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(a)(2), 1843(c)(8), 1843(c)(9), 1843(c)(12), 1843(c)(13),
and 1843(d) (1982) (Congress delegating authority to Board in recognition of its expertise); 12
U,S.C § 1844 (1982) (to carry out the provisions of, and prevent evasion of, the Bank Holding
Company Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1982) (to protect the safety and soundness of banking).
230. Various regulatory provisions impose conditions on the approved activity. See, e.g., 12
C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(95) (1988) (leasing); id. § 225.25(b)(8) (assurance); id § 225.25(b)(10)
(courier); id. § 225.25(b)(17) (foreign exchange); id. § 225.25(b)(18) (futures commission
merchant); id. § 225.25(b)(19) (futures and options on futures); id. § 225.25(b)(20) (tax
planning and preparation); id. § 225.25(b)(22) (check guaranty); id. § 225.25(b)(23) (collec-
tion agency); id. § 225.25(b)(24) (credit bureau).
231. See, e.g., Marine Bancorporation, 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 504, 506 (1972) (conditioning
approval on applicant's divestiture of land development activities).
232. See, e.g., Security Pac. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 800, 801 (1986) (real estate activities
authorized by state banking law); National Westminster Bank P.L.C., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584,
593-94 (1986) (securities activities); Mellon Nat'l Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 256, 256 (1985)
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Act;23 3 requiring divestiture of interests that pose anticompetitive
problems;23 4 and requiring divestiture of impermissible activities.235 The
Fed also extracts more controversial "voluntary commitments." 23 6
2. Five Conditional Contexts
The various substantive contexts in which the Board imposes condi-
tions and extracts commitments involve a number of variables. On a
general level, these variables involve questions of law, policy, and fact.
Working with these variations, the Article constructs five ideal types of
conditions or commitments. Innumerable variations on these five themes
(tandem operations); Irving Bank Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 173, 174 (1985) (tandem
operations); Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 249, 249 (1982) (selling obligations of the United
States).
233. See, e.g., AmeriTrust Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 238, 239 (1980) (examining compliance
with the Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-05). The Community Reinvestment Act
requires the Board to assess the BHC applicant's record of meeting the credit needs of the
entire community, including low and moderate income neighborhoods, and the consistency
with which these practices comport with the safe and sound operation of the institution. After
finding "serious violations" of the Act, the Board imposed a conditon that AmeriTrust
"promptly begin to maintain for a period of one year, or longer, ... a register of all inquiries
and applications for mortgage and home improvement loans made in person at offices of
AmeriTrust in Cuyahoga County" in addition to obtaining voluntary commitments for further
action by AmeriTrust. Id. at 242 (compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act's
Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1980)).
234. See, e.g., First City Bancorporation of Texas, 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 105, 106 (1973). The
Board voted to approve application subject to the condition that
[aipplicant divest itself of direct or indirect control, or control through one or more
other persons, of any and all voting shares, in excess of 5 percent of the voting shares
of [two banks], such divestiture to be effected within six months after the effective
date of this Order unless such period is extended... [when applicant's retention of
influence over the two banks would be] anticompetitive and not in the public interest.
Id. at 106.
235. See, e.g., Citicorp, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 149, 155 (1984) (real estate and insurance
activities); D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 412,413 (1977) (real estate); Depositors Corp.,
60 Fed. Res. Bull. 312, 312 (1974) (tract of land).
236. See, e.g., Fleet Fin. Group, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 62, 66 (1988). The Board, approving the
merger of a BHC and the acquisition of banking and nonbanking subsidiaries, relied on Fleet's
commitment to divest some of its Norstar Bancorporation offices in certain markets on or
prior to the proposed merger in order to mitigate the anticompetitive effect of the proposal.
In Banc One Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 124 (1987), applicant made commitments in response
to allegations by protestant that banks did not satisfy requirements of the Community
Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C §§ 2901-05 (1982). Applicant specifically committed to:
(1) Adopt expanded guidelines for CRA programs at subsidiary banks...; (2)Develop
marketing plans designed to increase loan penetration in low-and moderate-in-
come neighborhoods; (3) Develop a regularly scheduled program designed to assure
the adequate provision of information to subsidiary bank personnel regarding CRA
requirements... ; (4) Develop programs to train personnel to utilize more effectively
programs for community and economic development; and (5) Establish and maintain
an officer-level CRA committee reporting directly to Applicant's Board of Directors,
in order to monitor and evaluate subsidiary bank CRA compliance.
Banc One Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 125-26. Voluntary commitments usually are not
published. See, e.g., Riley County Bancshares, Inc., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 55, 55 (1988). In Riley,
the Board approved formation of a Bank Holding Company "[biased upon the facts of record,
including commitments made by applicant and its principals in connection with this applica-
tion." Id. The Board never articulated these commitments.
74 IOWA LAW REVIEW 837
may emerge, but these five categories capture a good deal of the richness
and complexity involved. The five types are set forth in order ranging from
the least controversial use of any agency's conditioning or commitment
power to the most controversial.
a. The Perfect Condition
The least controversial type of condition or voluntary commitment is
one that is fact-specific, clearly within the legal power of the Board to
impose, and furthers a previously articulated Board policy. The most
common condition of this type requires an agency to consider the safety
and soundness of a proposed activity. The Board must consider these
factors under both section 3 and section 4 of the Act. In so doing, the staff
is often confronted with applicants whose capital adequacy or debt-
to-equity ratio appears to be borderline. As a condition of approval, the
staff may request that the applicant agree to increase capital or reduce debt.
This kind of condition is fully grounded in law, policy, and fact. It also
permits the Board to carry out its regulatory duties without denying an
otherwise grantable application and enables the applicant to achieve its
business goals in a safe manner. This kind of condition provides regulatory
flexibility and allows the staff to treat each applicant's situation on an
individual basis.2 37
b. The Policy Condition
A second type of condition is one that is usually fact-specific and
arguably within the agency's legal authority, but illustrative of a policy that
is not formally articulated or widely known. This context raises issues akin
to those present in SEC v. Chenery.238 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court, inter alia, dealt with the question of whether the agency
had to make policy through use of a rulemaking proceeding or whether it
could formulate new policy in the context of an adjudication and, in effect,
apply that new policy retroactively. The Board may have the power to apply
a condition that represents a new policy or a policy that it has not formally
articulated, but should the Board proceed in this manner?
The answer may turn on how likely the issue is to arise in other cases,
or whether its imposition in this particular case is fact-specific. If the
condition represents a policy that the Board consistently pursues in cases of
this type, but nevertheless has failed to adopt in the context of a rulemak-
ing, the policy may not have been as fully developed or as carefully thought
237. See Texas Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 58 Fed. Res. Bull. 838, 841 (1972). In Texas
Commerce Bancshares, Inc., the Board approved acquisition of shares of one bank subject to the
condition that shares of a second bank acquired incident to the transaction be divested within
a specified period of time. This condition was based on the Board's finding that acquisition of
shares of both banks would have an anticompetitive effect on the banking market. Id. In
Security Pac. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 381 (1987), as with any action implicating the Douglas
Amendment, the Board ultimately conditioned its approval upon the approval of the state
banking supervisor of the state in which the bank sought to be acquired is located. Id. at 841.
In this case, approval from the Oregon Banking Supervisor was required. Id.
238. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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out as it should have been. Thus, even if the policy is widely known, but not
formally articulated, the use of conditions to implement the 'policy may
deprive applicants and the Board of an opportunity to consider the
ramifications of the policy beyond the narrow context of the specific case.
239
If the policy is not only unarticulated, but unknown as well, it is subject to
the retroactivity problems that arose in Chenery. Moreover, if this policy is
furthered by voluntary commitments and, thus, never appears in the
Board's published orders, it can be a source of "secret law."
c. Legal Authority Conditions
Legal authority conditions involve issues in which the Board's regula-
tory authority is at best unclear and, at worst, nonexistent. It often will
embody a known Board policy, but one that has not been formally
articulated and it may or may not be fact-specific. For example, the Board
has been troubled by the financial risks to a bank holding company system
when one of its subsidiary banks conducts real estate investment and
development activities. To deal with this problem, the Board will condition
its approval of BHC applications to acquire state-chartered banks on the
assurance that the newly acquired state bank will not engage in real estate
development activities.
The problem with such conditions is twofold: (1) some states-for
example, Washington and California-authorize real estate development,
as well as other activities the Board might frown upon;240 and (2) the Board
has agreed that it lacks legal authority to regulate activities of state-
chartered banks.24 ' Arguably, conditions of this type inappropriately
extend federal jurisdiction into the state's domain.
These conditions, nevertheless, have been particularly common in the
real estate development and insurance areas. The Board often insists on
these voluntary commitments on behalf of both state-chartered bank
subsidiaries of bank holding companies and their subsidiaries. In Equimark
239. See, e.g., First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d
434 (10th Cir. 1984). In First Bancorporation, the court overturned a Board order conditioning
approval of a section 4 acquisition of an industrial loan company on the applicant's agreement
not to engage in NOW activity through this company, even though it was permissible under
state law. Id. at 436-37. The Board additionally subjected such activity already engaged in by
the applicant's subsidiaries to banking regulations. Id. The court characterized the Board's
action as an impermissible attempt to create legislative policy by adjudicative order. Id. at 438.
According to the court, NOW activity cannot be considered "banking" as a matter of law,
and thus, cannot be subject to banking regulations. Id. at 437. The court also found the
Board's attempt to apply these conditions to the applicant's previously acquired loan company
particularly egregious because the Board made absolutely no conclusions, and its order
contained no adjudicative facts, relevant to that company. Id. at 438. Finally, the court
recognized the impropriety of the Board's subsequent use of the order as precedent to impose
similar conditions on other applicants engaged in NOW activity, characterizing the Board's
original order as "merely a vehicle by which a general policy would be changed." Id. at 437.
240. For specific authorization of banks to invest and develop real estate, see CA. FiN. CODE
§ 751.3 (West 1989); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.04.212(1)(a)-(b) (West 1986). For specific
authorization of banks to act as insurance agents, see CAL. FiN. CODE § 1208 (West 1989) (in
towns of less than 5000 persons).
241. See Merchants Nat'l Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876, 881 (1987).
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Corporation,242 for example, Equimark sought to acquire a nonbanking
subsidiary of a state-chartered bank authorized to engage in real estate
investment and development activities. Another subsidiary of the same
bank was authorized to engage in general insurance activities. The Board
obtained assurances from Equimark that in both cases the activities would
be discontinued and either divested or dissolved within a predetermined
time period.
In this and other cases like it, the Board argued that such activities are
impermissible because the Board "has not determined that real estate
investment and development activity is closely related to banking under
section 4(c)(8) of the Act, and thus this activity is not permissible for bank
holding companies under section 4 of the Act. '243 Recently, the Board took
a different approach in section 3 cases. The Board proposed that real estate
development activities conducted directly or indirectly by a state bank
subsidiary of a bank holding company would constitute per se unsafe and
unsound banking practice warranting the Board's denial of any such
application under section 3 of the BHCA.2 44
This resort to rulemaking makes good sense, particularly when the
Board's legal authority to implement such a policy is unclear. It is also a
sound approach to take when the Board thinks its authority is clear, but its
policy is not. Yet, rulemaking is not a cure-all for the kinds of commitment
problems raised by the Equimark example. Even if we assume that such a
policy is within the Board's statutory power to implement, opponents argue
that a per se rule runs counter to the statute's requirement that section 3
criteria be considered "in every case."245 The Act seems to mandate an
individual determination of the financial and managerial factors of each
applicant and its proposed subsidiary bank.246
In short, resort to the Board's rulemaking power may be inappropriate
to resolve a controversial policy question proposed as a per se rule. When
formulation of a per se rule is not possible, the Board may be able to impose
a condition that relates only to the financial condition of the individual
applicant. This individualized process, as mandated by the statute, may
require that any imposition of conditions or extraction of commitments be
fact-specific and related to the financial soundness of the applicant. The
Board's use of applicants as vehicles for policy implementation arguably
242. 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 61 (1988).
243. Security Pac. Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 800, 801 (1986). Security Pacific Corporation
sought to acquire an Arizona bank which operated a subsidiary engaging in real estate
development activity. Id. at 801. The Board conditioned approval on the applicant's divesti-
ture of real estate development activity, even though Arizona banking law permitted this
activity. See id. (citing ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 6-326 (Supp. 1988)). See also D.H. Baldwin Co.,
63 Fed. Res. Bull. 412,412 (1977) (conditioning approval on dhestiture of real estate activites,
which state banking law permits, and determining that a particular activity is "unsound").
244. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2) (1988) (notice of proposed rulemaking appearing in 52
Fed. Reg. 42,301 (1987)).
245. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982).
246. Letter from Wells Fargo & Co. to William IV. Wiles, Sec. Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System (Dec. 3, 1987) (comments in response to proposed regulation, Docket
No. R-0616, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,301 (1987)).
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stretches its powers too far. To sidestep this problem with a per se rule
deprives the applicant of a statutorily mandated, fact-specific determina-
tion.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that rulemaking by the Board is
preferable to a policy condition that is based on an unknown or unarticu-
lated, controversial Board policy. Rulemaking provides all applicants and
potentially affected parties with an opportunity to participate. More
importantly, it enables the Board to think through the long-term policy
implications of its positions. This suggests a fourth kind of condition.
d. Prospective Conditions
Prospective conditions are closely related to policy and legal authority
conditions. A prospective condition embodies a policy that is arguably
enacted within the Board's legal authority. It may or may not be formally
articulated, but does not necessarily arise from the facts of the specific
application. The applicant is purely a policy vehicle because it must agree
to conditions regarding future activities in which it presently has no
intention of engaging.
Commitments to refrain from real estate development as well as
insurance activities are sometimes extracted even though the applicant has
no present intention to engage in these activities. 247 Although this may
circumvent the argument that the statute bans per se rules, such commit-
ments are, in their own way, another form of per se rule. The agency makes
an activity impossible in the future even though the activity is not a part of
the present case. The strength of the Board's bargaining position is
particularly strong because the applicant is usually not willing to fight for
something it does not presently plan to do.
e. Null Conditions
Finally, the most controversial conditions would be those that are not
grounded in law, not based on articulated Board policy, or not closely
related to the facts of the particular applicant's case. These may be called
null conditions and clearly would be ultra vires conditions.2 48
247. See, e.g, Yellowstone Holding Co., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 250, 251 (1980). The Board issued
an order approving the formation of a bank holding company under section 3 of the Act.
Approval was conditioned on the applicantes "commitment to comply promptly with any new
policy adopted by the Board concerning the disposition of income from the sale of credit life,
health or accident insurance in connection with loans made by Banks." Id. at 251. Although
the applicant was not presently engaging in such activity, and did not appear to have any
interest in doing so, the Board effectively foreclosed any possibility of such engagement other
than by ways prescribed by the Board according to general policy. The Board's action was not
necessarily related to the applicant's specific characteristics.
248. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839
F.2d 47, 67-68 (2d Cir. 1988) (striking down Board's interpretation of market share
limitations); First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d
434,437-38 (10th Cir. 1984) (striking down condition imposed by the Board, finding condition
was ultra vires and based on an incorrect interpretation of the law). In Securities Industry the
court reviewed a condition imposed by the Board in an order approving applications to engage
in certain limited securities activities under the Glass-Steagall Act. See Securities Industry, 839
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These conditions may be summarized as follows:
Condition Type Law Policy Fact-Specific
Perfect + + +
Policy + - + or-
Legal Authority + or - + or -
Prospective + + or -
Null
D. Regulatory Conditions, Voluntary Commitments, and the Limits of
the Bargaining Model as Applied to the Administrative Process
A recent Board report noted that bank holding companies "are often
responsive to suggestions from the Federal Reserve for improvements in
their ... [applications] or for changes to their proposals in order to limit
adverse effects and thereby increase the chances for approval." 249 The
negotiations between applicants and Federal Reserve Board staff are best
described by the bargaining model of the administrative process. 25 0 There
is no neutral third party adjudicator to resolve disputes at this stage of the
process. The issues that arise and the resolution that is reached is between
the applicant and the staff. As we have seen, an integral part of this
bargaining process is the Fed's use of conditions and the extraction of
voluntary commitments. It is not the purpose of this Article to second guess
the substantive wisdom of the results that these processes reach. This
Article is not concerned with the consequences of the Board's decisions, but
rather the processes by which decisions are made. It is for this reason that
it is important to examine the limits of the bargaining model as applied to
this kind of administrative process as well as the procedural consequences
of accepting or extracting voluntary commitments.
1. The Limits of the Bargaining Model
The bargaining model assumes that the decision reached between two
parties is a joint decision. This, in turn, assumes that each party has
something to gain and something to give in the process of making
compromises. For this process to work, neither party can have overwhelm-
ing bargaining superiority. In the regulatory process, however, the Fed has
a legal monopoly on the benefits that the applicants seek.251 Though a
F.2d at 68 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 20 (1982)). The condition limited underwriting activities of
applicants based on a percentage "market share" analysis. The court, finding this quantitative
limitation to be unreasonable and unsupported by the law as evidenced by past interpretations
of the Glass-Steagall Act and legislative history, struck down the condition. Id. For the original
order, see Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 502 (1987).
249. See BHC Hearings, supra note 151, at 410 (Board Report at B-6).
250. See supra p. 881.
251. See supra pp. 882-83. This is not to argue that the Fed's power should be equal to those
whom it regulates. Rather, it is to emphasize that when one uses the bargaining process as a
means of regulating, one must be aware of the limits of that process. Adversarial procedures
are more appropriate to resolve disagreements over significant issues of law or policy. In other
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denial of an application cannot be arbitrary, judicial review generally
operates as a check only in the most extreme cases. The agency's discretion
is not easily constrained. As a result, the bargaining process takes on great
importance. Because applicants do not want their requests to be denied,
they are susceptible to the Board's suggestions that they make certain
commitments or accept various conditions. Even if they disagree with the
legality or need for these conditions and commitments, they usually prefer
to accept them rather than to have their application denied. Something is
better than nothing.
This is not to argue that the Board misuses its power or improperly
manipulates applicants. Regulatory negotiations and the unequal bargain-
ing power that results are a natural by-product of the regulatory framework
that Congress established in the Bank Holding Company Act. The use of
conditions and commitments does not indicate a power grab by the Board.
The use of these regulatory tools is inherent in an applications process that,
by definition, requires a one-on-one decisionmaking process.
Moreover, this kind of regulatory process has many advantages. The
Board can pinpoint its concerns and, through conditions or commitments,
precisely tailor its regulation to meet those concerns. This bargaining or
negotiation approach also has advantages for the applicant. Rather than
risk outright denial of its application, bargaining allows the individual
applicant to achieve some, if not most, of its business goals. In addition, the
nature of the applicant's business transactions often necessitates prompt
Board action. It is in an applicant's interest simultaneously to negotiate an
acceptable regulatory result and take advantage of business opportunities.
In short, the nature of the regulatory system established by the BHCA, the
regulatory goals of the Board, the applicant's business needs, and the
Board's demand for prompt, focused action on the part of applicants make
a bargaining approach to the application process virtually inevitable.
The limits of this approach, however, are apparent in the context of
"voluntary commitments." In such contexts, the unequal bargaining
strength of the parties may result in involuntary agreements. The applicant
is advantaged, however, by the opportunity to accept a commitment that is
fact-specific, fully within the Board's power to impose, and directly related
to an articulated policy. Such acceptance can expedite the application
process, mitigate the Board's regulatory concerns, and allow the success of
the proposed transaction. But as we move away from the "perfect"
condition or commitment, the probability that the commitment is "volun-
tary" becomes less likely. This can have a number of unfortunate regulatory
consequences.
words, some kinds of issues are not appropriate for bargaining processes, though they may
very well involve regulatory demands that are ultimately justifiable.
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2. The Regulatory Consequences of Accepting or
Extracting Voluntary Commitments
Applicants may agree to the Board's requests; even when faced with a
commitment not to engage in activities they believe are fully allowed under
the law, or when asked to forego action that represents an unarticulated or
new policy. That agreement, however, is likely to be based on a "lesser of
two evils" kind of reasoning. Rather than entirely forego a proposed
acquisition, the applicant is often willing to choose a modified form of
approval.
One might argue, not unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist in South Dakota v.
Dole,252 that this choice nevertheless is made "voluntarily." In reality,
however, the applicant has no alternative; there is no regulatory substitute
for the authorization that the applicant seeks. Though we may assume that
the Board is carrying out its regulatory duties in a conscientious and
effective manner, an applicant's voluntary acceptance of a commitment
prevents the conversion of the bargaining model into an adjudicatory
model. In fact, the agency may be encouraged to bargain because voluntary
agreements will not be challenged by the applicant. Because applicants
have, in effect, waived their legal rights by voluntarily agreeing to condi-
tions, the agreement is impossible to challenge in court. There is no record
upon which findings of fact or conclusions of law are based, and upon
which courts could review the agency's determinations. Meaningful judicial
review under these circumstances would be impossible. A court could not
take the agreement between the parties ai. face value. To allow applicants to
undermine their agreements in court would allow them to whipsaw the
agency.
A commitment in the form of a condition stated in the Board's order,
however, is presumably supported by the record and subject to judicial
review. The possibility of judicial review equalizes the bargaining strength
of the applicant and the agency, and gives the applicant the opportunity to
transform the bargaining phase of the process into an adversarial phase.
The possibility of third-party adjudication also constrains the bargaining
process. Agency fears of what a third party might do if it imposes a
condition gives the applicant added bargaining power and helps keep the
bargaining phase of the process within legal guidelines.
But even if we assume that an applicant's decision to make a commit-
ment truly is voluntary, several regulatory consequences follow, particu-
larly when issues of law and policy are involved. The bargaining process
may give an inordinate amount of policymaking power to the staff involved.
Policymaking through the imposition of individual voluntary commitments
may remove long-term policy considerations from the Board's planning
processes and effectively exclude Board members from the decisionmaking
process. The following problem is illustrative.
On February 3, 1987, the Board of Governors of the Fed heard an
appeal involving section 20 of the BHCA. This hearing considered appli-
cations of Citicorp, J.P. Morgan and Co., Inc., and Bankers Trust New York
252. 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
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Corporation to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds, mortgage
related securities, consumer-receivable-related securities, and commercial
paper. The Board considered, among other things, whether a bank affiliate
was "engaged principally" in bank-ineligible underwriting activities. During
the negotiation phase of these proceedings, each bank holding company
had consented "voluntarily" to market share limitations while protesting
that commitments were not legally required or economically constructive.
The "voluntary" nature of the agreements made the policy decisions
inherent in the commitments appear as afait accompli when they ultimately
were presented to the Board. The following excerpt highlights how a
voluntary commitment can deprive the Board of an opportunity to exam-
ine fully the legal and policy implications of the staff positions embodied in
them.
VICE CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You've also proposed market
share tests on your activities as well, and I take it that you did that
to make it clear that even if you used some volume requirement,
volume measure of activity in the affiliate, you would not violate
some sort of market share test. I think you've all proposed about
three percent.
MR. WEATHERSTONE: Governor Johnson, I think we did
that reluctantly because we think the market share test has very
little to do with "principally engaged."
VICE CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I agree with that, but you
proposed it. I'm just asking.
MR. WEATHERSTONE: We proposed it, yes, but with some
reluctance. We think it serves very little purpose, but we did
propose it. We think it's anti-competitive, and I think the Justice
Department has a view about that as well.
VICE CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Why did you propose it?
MR. WEATHERSTONE: To expedite the applications.
GOVERNOR ANGELL: So, in other words, you thought we
might be more apt to approve it if that was in, but you see no
justification in terms of economic or legal reasons for having it in?
MR. WEATHERSTONE: We would rather not have it.
GOVERNOR ANGELL: You see no legal or economic justifi-
cation for it.
MR. THEOBALD: We take exception.
CHAIRMAN VOLCKER: The relevant question may not be
whether it's economic, but whether it's legal.2 53
The Board ultimately accepted these market share limitations. The Court
of Appeals, however, overturned the Board's decision in Securities Industry
Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 254
253. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Hearing on Citicorp, J.P. Morgan
& Co., Inc., and Bankers Trust New York Corp 83-84 (Feb. 3, 1987).
254. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 69
(2d Cir. 1988).
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Apart from shifting the policymaidng role to the staff, voluntary
commitments also can become a source of "secret law." Unlike the Securities
Industry case above, many voluntary commitments do not appear in the
Board's final order, are not likely to be challenged in court, and are not
likely to be widely known to the public. Many times the fact-specific,
confidential nature of these commitments requires that they be "priva-
tized." But fact-specific commitments made in a number of cases are likely,
over time, to add up to particular policies that may or may not have been
articulated by the Board. When the unarticulated policy is controversial, the
aggregation of fact-specific commitments poses a significant problem.
In short, commitments play a valuable fine-tuning, regulatory role.
But the further the commitment strays from the facts of a particular
request, or the more controversial the policy and legal positions of the staff,
the less voluntary these commitments are likely to be. In such situations, it
is more likely that the Board's power will remain relatively unchecked and
run the risk of being overextended. To retain the positive and useful
features of the bargaining approach to the BHCA's applications process,
and to limit the potential for abuse that may exist, it is necessary to consider
ways to equalize the bargaining power between applicants and the Board,
as well as to discern just when the bargaining model is appropriate and
when it is not.
3. Rationalizing Bargaining Positions
The Board's power in these cases is, as we have noted, a by-product of
the regulatory scheme set forth by Congress. That scheme is, by and large,
a good way to proceed in the routine case. When the agency, however,
extracts commitments in cases in which law and policy are unclear and the
issues controversial, the commitments are unlikelyto be voluntary. Condi-
tions that emerge from an expansive interpretation of the Board's legal
authority, or that represent controversial policy positions are somewhat less
of a problem because they are more easily challenged in court. This
possibility of appeal to a third-party decisionmaker strengthens the appli-
cant's bargaining power. Applicants can invoke what they believe to be the
likely perspective of decisionmakers beyond the staff. If the applicant's
characterization of the views of these third parties is persuasive, the staff
may modify the commitments or conditions as requested. If the staff does
not modify the commitments, a court or the Board itself may act, presum-
ably in the way that the applicant had predicted. One way to equalize
bargaining power between staff and applicant is to encourage judicial
review of "voluntary commitments." This would at least provide some
protection against the use of arguably ultra vires commitments.
Creating greater opportunities for judicial review can be accomplished
in two ways. First, when legal issues are in contention, the Board should
refrain from extracting or accepting voluntary commitments. Second, if a
voluntary commitment is accepted, it should be part of the Board's order
and, to the extent possible, converted into a condition which is part of the
administrative record and appealable to a court. There should be a
presumption that commitments involving serious questions of law or policy
are made to facilitate the processing of an initial application. Applicants do
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not concede that these commitments are either permitted or required
under the Bank Holding Company Act, and therefore, applicants reserve
the right to seek modification or termination of these commitments in court
or in another application proceeding. This process can be facilitated by
converting these commitments into conditions when the record allows.
Another way to equalize the bargaining relationships between staff and
applicants is to encourage the Board of Governors to look closely at
"voluntary commitments." The Board should be encouraged to view
commitments not as waivers, but as issues worthy of their careful consid-
eration.
In addition to the involvement of such third parties as courts or the
Board of Governors, it is important to recognize that certain issues are
more appropriate for adversarial dispute resolution models and less
appropriate for bargaining models. This is particularly the case when
important legal issues involving, for example, the jurisdictional reach of the
agency are in contention. Such questions should be decided in court and
should not be part of the bargaining process. When issues of policy are in
contention, adjudication, and especially rulemaking, are the appropriate
procedural responses. When law and policy are reasonably clear, however,
and only the financial strength of the applicant is at issue, a bargaining
model is more appropriate. The bargaining strength of the applicant is
enhanced if the applicant is financially strong and weakened if financially
unsound. Given the safety and soundness considerations of the Act, this is
as it should be.
Finally, another way to equalize bargaining power is to further clarify
the ninety-one-day rule. During the informational phase, perceptions
concerning such variables as economic conditions vary. A Board request for
additional information tolls the ninety-one-day period. Although requests
for new information are often necessary, there is often confusion concern-
ing when a file is informationally complete. To ensure that the informa-
tional and bargaining phases of the process are distinct, as well as to avoid
confusion concerning the running of the ninety-one-day period, the
Board's regulations should require an explicit Board finding that a file is
complete and ready for consideration. This is particularly needed in the
small minority of cases in which varying perceptions concerning the merits
of an application and a rapidly changing economic setting create confusion
about the running of the ninety one-day rule.
In short, problems emerge when the bargaining approach to regula-
tion is applied to issues more appropriate for adjudication or rulemaking.
Some are the inevitable result of the BHCA's regulatory processes. Some
result from good faith legal and policy differences between applicants, staff,
and, in some cases, the Board of Governors. Much, however, is due to both
the perception and the reality of unequal bargaining power.
It would be an overreaction to these problems to discourage the
flexibility and fine-tuning capabilities that conditions and commitments
make possible. It would be equally wrong, however, to assume that a true
bargaining model can apply in all regulatory contexts or that all commit-
ments are truly "voluntary." An appropriate balance between the flexibility
of a bargaining process and the potential abuse of a legal monopoly may
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best be achieved by equalizing the bargaining power between staff and
applicants and by counseling regulatory restraint on the part of the Board
when issues of law and policy are in serious contention.
CONCLUSION
The regulatory use of conditions and commitments can significantly
expand an agency's power and jurisdictional reach. In certain contexts, the
applicant's strong incentives to avoid litigation and to avoid the denial of its
requested regulatory benefits give the agency substantial, informal, and
largely unreviewable discretionary powers. This Article does not suggest
that these powers should be unnecessarily judicialized. Rather, it has
argued that in certain contexts these powers should be exercised with
restraint. Some conditions and commitments are not appropriate for the
bargaining context in which they arise. They involve issues that are best
resolved in more detailed rulemaking or adjudicatory procedures.
More importantly, this Article has looked at administrative conditions
and commitments in a contextual way. This approach highlights that what
appears to be voluntary, may in fact be involuntary, and what appears to be
a legal use of agency power is, in some circumstances, an extension into new
and often uncharted areas. Legal issues, or imporrant principles of feder-
alism may be at stake. On a more subtle level, there are complex relation-
ships between change and the legal processes by which it is accommodated
or frustrated that deserve further study.
Technological change has transformed banking and has altered our
conception of what a bank is or can be. Technological change also has
facilitated the globalization of financial markets. These changes have
created a changing banking industry whose structure is in flux. Competi-
tion from abroad, coupled with competition from new entities engaged in
what banks and traditional bank holding companies used to do almost
exclusively has created new tensions between market and political regula-
tory forces. Increasingly, the forces are pulling in opposite directions,
particularly for larger bank holding companies that seek to compete
nationally and globally. In this context of global, technological, and market
change, how should the legal system respond? How should the new
regulatory issues that these changes have spawned be decided, and who
should make the decisions?
The Board sometimes has used conditions in controversial cases to
deal with these changes, extending regulation into areas where it was
arguably not intended. The Board has been true to the conception of
banking that underlies statutes passed during a very different time to solve
some similar, but also some very different societal problems. There are
limits to the extent an agency can either retard change in an industry that
now faces new global and domestic competition or restructure and regulate
it in new and more meaningful ways.
New Deal agencies gradually extended their regulatory powers to
conform to changing conditions, but they did so with certain assumptions
in place: regulators were dealing with domestic regulation, not interna-
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tional competition, and to a large extent they were not dealing with the
techflological change that is transforming the marketplace. Today, the
related factors of globalization and technology typify the financial services
industry. These factors and the rapid change that they encourage undercut
more common-law-like regulatory approaches that depend on incremental
change. Without comprehensive Congressional reform, the incremental
regulation accomplished by regulatory conditions is doomed to failure. It
ultimately will be seen not as a form of agency fine-tuning, but as agency
obstruction to market innovation. For the regulatory system to mediate
between market and political forces, there must be some congruence
between the goals pursued by these two fundamental sources of change.
This requires new global statutes for a new global age.

